Transfrontier complications - Some legal perspectives on the Kavango-Zambezi transfrontier conservation area: An analysis of the memorandum of understanding by Young, Hannah Lucy
Name: Hannah Lucy Young 
 
Student Number: YNGHAN001 
 
Qualification: Master of Laws (LLM) 
 
Supervisor: Professor Jan Glazewski 
 
Title: TRANSFRONTIER COMPLICATIONS – Some Legal 
Perspectives on the Kavango-Zambezi Transfrontier Conservation Area 
and an Analysis of the Memorandum of Understanding. 
 
 
Research dissertation presented for the approval of the Senate in fulfilment of part of the 
requirements for the Master of Laws in approved courses and a minor dissertation. The 
other part of the requirement for this qualification was the completion of a programme of 
courses. 
 
I hereby declare that I have read and understood the regulations governing the submission 
of LLM dissertations, including those relating to length and plagiarism, as contained in 
the rules of this University, and that this dissertation conforms to those regulations. 
 
Date: 12th February 2007 
 
 
Signed: 
 
 
 
  
2 
CONTENTS 
 
DESCRIPTION OF RESEARCH METHODOLOGY……………….  5  
 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS………………………………………….  5 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS…………………………………………  6 
 
Chapter 
1. Introduction         7 
 
2. Instruments at the International Level 
 2.1 Introduction        14 
 2.2 The Convention on Biodiversity     16 
 2.3 The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species 17 
 2.4 The Convention on Migratory Species    20 
 2.5 The Ramsar Convention      22 
 2.6 The World Heritage Site Convention     23 
 
3. Instruments at the Regional Level 
3.1 The African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural 
Resources        25 
3.2 The Permanent Okavango River Basin Agreement   27 
3.3 The SADC Wildlife Protocol      28 
 
 
4. Legislation at the Domestic Level       
 4.1 Angola        33 
 4.2 Botswana        36 
 4.3 Namibia        38 
 4.4 Zambia        39 
  
3 
 4.5 Zimbabwe        40 
 
5. An Analysis of the KAZA TFCA MoU  
 5.1 Introduction to the MoU      42 
5.2 The Issue of Sovereignty and the Role of Stakeholders  43 
5.3 Membership of Regional and International Conventions  49 
5.4 The Twin Aims of Conservation and Tourism   50 
5.5 The Geographical Extent of the KAZA TFCA   52 
5.6 Objectives and Principles of the KAZA TFCA   53 
5.7 Institutional Framework of the KAZA TFCA   60 
5.8 Financing of the KAZA TFCA     66 
5.9 Enforcement of Provisions      68 
 
6. Conclusions and Recommendations  
 6.1: Participation in International and Regional Conventions  70 
 6.2: Provision for Enforcement and Penalties for Non-compliance  71 
 6.3: Mandatory Inclusion of Environmental Ministers   71 
 6.4: Decentralisation of Powers      72 
 6.5: Stakeholder Representation      73 
 6.6: Harmonization of Environmental Policy     73 
 6.7: Concluding Remarks        74 
  
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY …………………………………………….   75 
 
APPENDIX A: Text of the KAZA TFCA MoU………………   80 
 
 
 
 
 
  
4 
 
 
 
 
 
Description of Research Methodology: 
 
The majority of this work was conducted as a desktop study, and the bibliography is 
included below the body of the paper. However, the paper is also informed by a number 
of personal interviews and communications conducted with people involved with or 
affected by the creation of the KAZA TFCA. These individuals included Dr Leo Braack 
(Director of the Transfrontier division of Conservation International), Mr Adam Young 
(Director of Chobezi Ltd, a tourism operation based in Botswana but specializing in 
transfrontier tourism), certain Namibian and Botswana immigration officials, Mr Fynn 
Corry (former Operations Manager of Sioma Ngwezi National Park, Zambia) and Mr 
Vladimir Russo (advisor to the Minister of Environment and Urban Affairs, Angola), as 
well as the attendance of a lecture by Dr Maano Ramutsindela (a specialist in 
transfrontier conservation areas who is based in the Department of Environmental and 
Geographical Science at the University of Cape Town). 
 
List of Illustrations: 
Figure 1 Map illustrating the geographical area of the KAZA TFCA……. 9  
Figure 2 Table illustrating participation of the KAZA TFCA Member States  
in the Biodiversity-related international conventions…………… 15 
Figure 3 Diagram illustrating cooperation in terms of Article 4(2)(a)  
of the MoU………………………………………………………. 55 
 
 
 
List of Abbreviations: 
AU:   African Union 
  
5 
CBD:   Convention on Biodiversity 
CITES:  Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species 
CMS:   Convention on Migratory Species 
KAZA:  Kavango-Zambezi 
MoU:  Memorandum of Understanding 
SADC:  South African Development Community 
TFCA:  Transfrontier Conservation Area 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
6 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the official opening in 2000 of the Kgalakgadi Transfrontier Park which straddles 
the border between Botswana and South Africa, political leaders in the SADC (South 
African Development Community) region have increasingly embraced and promoted the 
concept of Trans Frontier Conservation Areas (TFCAs)1. Political boundaries between 
the countries of Africa were initially established during the ‘Scramble for Africa’ in the 
nineteenth century2, and were generally representative of compromises between the 
competing interests of the colonising states. Boundaries were delineated along geometric 
or linear projections on maps, or otherwise corresponded with geographic features such 
as rivers or mountain ranges3. The boundaries therefore ignored not only the distribution 
of existing African populations but also fragmented ecosystems. In many cases, fences 
were erected along these borders, hampering traditional migration routes4. Consequently, 
many ecosystems were divided internationally and different management plans applied to 
their separate parts. One of the principal features of TFCAs is obviously that they aim to 
straddle these international boundaries and create areas of co-operative management. 
 
Another distinctive feature of the TFCA concept is the emphasis on multiple resource use 
within the area. Effectively, they may incorporate an amalgam of different land-use 
regimes and types of natural resource utilisation within their boundaries, even including 
consumptive use5. This is a fundamental shift away from the original concept of trans-
frontier parks, such as the Kgalakgadi Transfrontier Park, which only encompassed 
already-protected conservation areas such as national parks. The definition of 
‘Transfrontier Conservation Area’ as given in the Preamble of the Memorandum of 
                                                 
1
 Hanks, J: ‘Transfrontier Conservation Areas (TFCAs) in southern Africa: their role in conserving 
biodiversity, socioeconomic development and promoting a culture of peace.’ (Journal of Sustainable 
Forestry 17(1/2): 127-148. (2003). 
2
 Mayoral-Phillips A.J: ‘Transboundary Areas in Southern Africa: Meeting the Needs of Conservation or 
Development?’ 
3
 Mayoral-Phillips, supra note 2 
4
 Hanks, J, supra note 1 
5
 Suich, Helen with Kennedy, Elizabeth; Bruner, Aaron; Pilgrim, John and Vynne, Stacy: ‘Transfrontier 
Conservation Areas Conservation and Socio-Economic Impact Indicators.  
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Understanding for the KAZA TFCA emphasises this difference between a Transfrontier 
Conservation Area and a Transfrontier Park, as it specifies that such an area is a: 
‘large ecological region that straddles the boundaries of two or more countries, 
encompassing one or more protected areas, as well as multiple resources use areas’ 
 Figure 1: The KAZA TFCA according to the MoU.  
The KAZA TFCA is one of the largest TFCAs ever conceived of, incorporating a 
massive area of 278 000 square kilometres of savannah, wetlands, rivers and woodlands.  
At five times the size of the Kruger National Park, and roughly the size of Italy, it 
includes areas of no less than five SADC (South African Development Corporation) 
countries, namely Angola, Botswana, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe. A number of 
features of outstanding natural interest, such as the Victoria Falls, the Kafue wetlands and 
the Okavango Swamps lie within the area, which also includes several highly significant 
river systems, namely the Okavango, Zambezi and Chobe Rivers.  
 
As a consequence of its massive size, the development incorporates an especially wide 
variety of land-use regimes. Fourteen national parks and game reserves have been 
enveloped, but there are also a large number of conservancies, game management areas 
and tourism of hunting concessions within the area6, as can be seen from the map above. 
Furthermore, there are territories now included in the park where local communities have 
been resident for generations. 
 
Significantly, a portion of the KAZA TFCA is home to Africa’s largest population of 
African Elephant (Loxodonta africana). More than 130 000 elephant live in the Chobe 
region of Botswana, and a barrier of landmines in the Cuando-Cubango Province of 
Angola prevents these elephant from reaching their historical foraging grounds in Angola 
and Zambia7. One of the most high-profile aspects of the KAZA TFCA development is 
the de-mining of this area to create a corridor for elephant and other wildlife. A long-
running and highly controversial debate exists as to whether the Chobe elephant 
population should be controlled by culling. If the existing bottle-neck were relieved by 
opening up migratory corridors, advocates of the TFCA argue, then such culling might 
not be required8. 
 
                                                 
6
 Concept Paper: Transfrontier Conservation and Tourism Development in the Okavango and Upper 
Zambezi River Basins. 
7
 Roots of Peace and Conservation International – July 5th 2005 Press Release – ‘New Partnership to Clear 
Landmines for African Elephants’. 
8
 Hanks, J, quoted in Rogers, D ‘Roving Ambassadors for Transfrontier Conservation’ http://www.africa-
geographic.com/Archives 
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TFCAs have been lauded for their putative multi-faceted role. This role is usually 
interpreted as three-fold – the function of these areas is to promote a culture of peace, to 
play a role in socioeconomic development and to conserve biodiversity910. Biodiversity 
conservation is in fact generally accepted to be of primary importance in TFCA 
development. This paper deals with the effectiveness of TFCAs as legal instruments in 
the achievement of biodiversity conservation, and with the effectiveness of the KAZA 
TFCA in particular. 
 
With reference to biodiversity conservation, it is now generally accepted that it is too late 
to conserve all species or areas that are under threat. Consequently, a ‘triage strategy’ has 
been adopted in the selection of which areas to conserve11. In terms of this strategy, 
conservation efforts are focused upon those areas with the highest concentrations of 
endemic species which are the most threatened by habitat loss. This is a species-based 
approach, reinforced by the assumption that when habitat is fragmented, there will be 
species loss. It is precisely this habitat fragmentation which the very concept of TFCAs 
can hope to overcome, particularly through the medium of wildlife corridors. 
 
In terms of the triage strategy, the elephant cannot but be a significant species. It is a 
species which captures the imagination of the public (which is significant in terms of both 
tourism and donor funding) and furthermore elephant populations have an undeniable 
impact upon the ecology of any area which they inhabit. The de-mining of the corridor 
through the Cuando-Cubango Province is a topic which has been widely publicised and 
has become an issue which many people internationally identify with the KAZA TFCA. 
The African elephant in the context of the KAZA TFCA can truly be said to be both a 
keystone and a flagship species. 
 
At the international level, there are various conventions which have the potential to affect 
the management or conservation of the wildlife population within the KAZA TFCA area. 
These include the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Flora and 
                                                 
9
 Hanks, J; supra note 1 
10
 Suich, H; supra note 5 
11
 Hanks, J; supra note 1 
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Fauna (CITES), the Convention on Migratory Species (CMS) and the Convention on 
Biodiversity (CBD). However, not all of the five countries have ratified the same 
conventions. At the regional level, all five of the countries involved in the KAZA TFCA 
are party to the SADC Protocol on Wildlife Management, as signed in August of 1999. 
At the domestic level, each country has its own Acts, amendments and promulgations 
relating to wildlife management and policy. Many countries in the SADC region have 
emerged only recently from fraught struggles for independence, and it would be an 
unlikely area in which to find states willing to sacrifice any aspects of their sovereignty in 
the cause of conservation. TFCA agreements such as the bilateral agreement between 
Botswana and South Africa which established the Kgalakgadi Transfrontier Park can 
specifically recognise the ‘sovereign equality and territorial integrity’ of the relevant 
states, but there are commentators who believe that it is difficult to refer to an ‘undivided 
ecosystem’ in a situation where sovereignty remains intact, and effective management of 
these areas may be hampered12.  
 
The issue of sovereignty lies at the heart of transboundary wildlife management in 
Southern Africa. Multilateral conventions such as the Convention on Biodiversity may 
claim to respect sovereignty13. However, membership of such conventions infers 
international responsibilities and obligations which are ultimately erosive of the concept 
of absolute sovereignty. This erosion is often responsible on the one hand for the non-
accession of States to treaties or conventions which they see as infringements of 
sovereignty, and, on the other hand, is the reason for the non-enforceability and 
‘toothlessness’ of many international conventions14. There is always a balance which 
needs to be struck, in order that a convention be inoffensive enough to encourage States 
to become members and yet still bear some weight as a legal instrument. Any convention 
which deals with transboundary issues and requires transboundary cooperation is even 
more likely to impinge on traditional perceptions of sovereignty, as such a document 
necessarily attempts to impose certain standards of practice between neighbouring states.  
                                                 
12
 Mramba, Sist J ‘The Peace Parks Initiative: A Breakthrough Towards Sustainable Natural Resource 
Management in Southern Africa?’ 214 11 SAJELP (2004). 
13
 Preamble to the Convention on Biodiversity 
14
 Glazewski, Jan, pers.comms 
  
12 
There exists at present a multi-layered mosaic of legislation purporting to play some role 
in the conservation and management of the KAZA TFCA region. What remains to be 
explored is the effectiveness of the existing legislation and the potential effect of the 
TFCA MoU. Will this document comprise an efficient and comprehensive action plan for 
the region as a whole, unifying and simplifying the present morass of policy statements 
and promulgations, or will it simply add another stratum of uncertain practical value? 
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2. LEGAL INSTRUMENTS AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL 
 
2.1:  Introduction 
 
The table below illustrates the international biodiversity-related conventions which each 
of the KAZA TFCA member states have acceded to. It is immediately apparent that such 
membership is patchy and inconsistent. Indeed, the only convention of which all five 
states are members is the Convention on Biodiversity. Furthermore, this Convention is 
the only one which Angola is in fact a member of. None of the States are party to the 
Migratory Species Convention, as elaborated upon below. This pattern of omission and 
inconsistency is incompatible with the intentions which lie behind the establishment of 
any Transfrontier conservation area. Hanks15 and other commentators maintain that the 
motivating factors for the establishment of TFCAs are, broadly speaking, the 
conservation of biodiversity, socioeconomic development, and the promotion of a culture 
of peace. The lack of coherent membership of these international conventions does not 
speak of a spirit of international cooperation which would necessarily underlie a culture 
of peace. The lack of accession to these conventions, which are broadly grouped as ‘the 
biodiversity conventions’, does not speak of an existing commitment to trans-frontier 
biodiversity conservation. Essentially a question remains to be answered as to why these 
five countries are seeking to adopt resolutions and MoU’s with aims identical in many 
respects to those of existing conventions which they have chosen to ignore.   
                                                 
15
 Hanks, J; supra note 1 
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 ANGOLA BOTSWANA NAMIBIA ZAMBIA ZIMBABWE 
CBD ● ● ● ● ● 
CITES  ● ● ● ● 
CMS      
WHC  ●  ● ● 
RAMSAR  ● ● ●  
Figure 2: Table illustrating the patchy and inconsistent membership of the international 
biodiversity-related conventions of the KAZA TFCA member States16 
 
CBD: Convention on Biodiversity 
CITES: Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Flora and Fauna  
CMS: Convention on Migratory Species 
WHC: World Heritage Site Convention 
 
 
This paper does not have the scope to examine all the possible reasons for the 
inconsistent and often poor representation of the SADC states in terms of international 
treaties. However, it is an undeniable truth that many African countries have achieved 
independence at great cost, and their hard-won sovereignty is a closely-guarded 
commodity. The international conventions described below are all the results of Northern, 
developed-nation initiatives, and there may exist a certain resistance to them for this 
reason. Possibly, regional conventions, such as the SADC Wildlife Protocol, and regional 
initiatives such as the KAZA TFCA are more likely to gain support precisely because of 
the fact that they are local initiatives and are not being imposed upon African nations by 
the developed nations. The developed nations primarily responsible for the establishment 
                                                 
16
 References here comprise the relevant pages of the official websites for each convention: 
CBD: http://www.biodiversity.org/world/parties.asp 
CITES: http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/parties/alphabet.shtml 
CMS: http://www.cms.int/about/part_lst.htm 
WHC: http://www.whc.unesco.org/en/list 
Ramsar: http://www.ramsar.org/key-cp-e.htm 
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of international conventions such as the biodiversity conventions are in many instances 
the nations whom the African states struggled to gain independence from, and it is in this 
respect perhaps not surprising that they should be reluctant to compromise any aspect of 
sovereignty in order to accede to such conventions. Where the initiatives are locally 
driven however, States may be more willing to compromise in order to achieve common 
goals which they view as more representative of their interests.  
 
 
2.2: THE CONVENTION ON BIODIVERSITY (THE CBD): 
 
The Convention on Biodiversity enjoys a unique position in relation to the KAZA TFCA 
in that it is the only biodiversity convention which all five countries have acceded to, and 
also the only biodiversity convention of which Angola is a member. When parties ratify 
the treaty, they affirm their sovereign rights over their own biological resources, but also 
accept responsibility for conserving biological diversity and using biological resources in 
a sustainable manner17. The primary focus of the convention is on sustainable 
development18, and the convention provides specifically for developed party States to 
provide financial assistance to developing States in order to allow them to meet the 
financial obligations incurred in implementing the treaty19, which may have been 
instrumental in encouraging the developing nations such as those in the KAZA TFCA 
area to become parties to the Convention.  
 
The Convention on Biodiversity is an extremely important convention in terms of 
conservation, and the consistent membership of the CBD in the KAZA area is significant 
in that it suggests initially a united attitude towards the protection of biodiversity. 
However, the CBD is only one of a suite of biodiversity conventions and is also 
essentially a framework document with little provision for direct enforcement. 
Membership of the CBD does not obviate the necessity of membership of the other 
                                                 
17
 
17
 Ciesin Thematic Guides – The Convention on Biodiversity 
http://www.ciesin.org/TG/PI/TREATY/bio.html 
18
 Ibid 
19
 CBD, Article 20 
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biodiversity conventions which are aimed at specific areas of biodiversity conservation 
(such as migratory species or wetlands). Furthermore, mere membership of the CBD 
achieves little if its provisions are not implemented at the domestic level. 
 
 
 
2.3 CITES: THE CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN 
ENDANGERED SPECIES OF WILD FAUNA AND FLORA 
 
CITES is the convention which immediately comes to mind when considering issues 
regarding elephant management in the SADC region, chiefly in consequence of the 
heated debate in recent years with regard to trade in ivory. CITES is a multilateral treaty 
designed to protect species of plants and animals determined by the Convention to be 
presently or foreseeably threatened by commercial movement20. The basic premise of the 
Convention is that wildlife conservation can be improved by controlling trade in 
endangered species, in order to reduce over-exploitative trade of certain species while 
enhancing the free commercial movement of plentiful wildlife21. 
 
The mechanisms of CITES involve a system of import and export permits which serve as 
basic control mechanisms in regulating the international passage of those species judged 
to be threatened with extinction. Species which the scientific body of the CITES 
organisation regard as requiring trade protection are listed in one of three appendices. 
This listing determines what permits are required to trade in that species, as well as what 
conditions must be met before such permits will be issued. Appendix I is the strictest 
category and species listed therein have been classified as ‘presently’ endangered, while 
species in Appendix II are ‘potentially’ endangered. Appendix III incorporates those 
species which are ‘locally’ endangered22. These species are not endangered on an 
                                                 
20
 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, July 1, 1975 
(CITES) 
21
 Schofield, A.H. ‘International Trade in Wildlife: How Effective is the Endangered Species Treaty?’ 
California Western International Law Journal Vol. 15 (1985) 
22
 Schofield, supra note 22 
  
17 
international scale but are considered by an individual party state as subject to regulation 
within its own jurisdiction and other CITES members are expected to respect this. 
 
The primary distinction, for our purposes, between Appendix I and Appendix II species is 
that commercial trade is not permitted (except in very exceptional circumstances) for 
Appendix I species, whereas Appendix II species may be traded for commercial 
purposes; albeit subject to strict regulation. The foundation of the furore in the mid- 
1990’s was that countries in the so-called ‘Consumptive Use Bloc’ of Southern Africa 
proposed the downlisting of the African elephant from Appendix I to Appendix II23. The 
chief purpose of this putative downlisting was to allow commercial trade in ivory – a 
huge potential source of income for these countries.  
 
The countries in the Consumptive Use Bloc included four of the five countries currently 
party to the KAZA TFCA MoU, namely Botswana, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
Angola never became a party to CITES. The reasons behind this are not entirely certain 
but cannot be unrelated to the reality of the bloody civil war that gripped the country 
throughout the period in which it might otherwise have acceded to the Convention 
previously. What is undeniable is that Angola emerged from this tortured period of 
history some years ago and has as yet failed to become a recognised party to CITES24. 
Angola’s National Assembly did ‘approve’ the Convention in 200125, but as yet have 
made no attempt to embody its provisions into national law, and are not recognised as a 
party by the CITES administration. This is an alarming omission. CITES is the most 
widely accepted international conservation consensus ever developed26 and a reluctance 
to accede to the treaty may be indicative of a lack of concurrence with its underlying 
philosophies and objectives. The practical legal aspects are also ominous in terms of the 
conservation objectives of the KAZA TFCA. One of CITES’s most controversial 
provisions is contained in Article X, which is titled ‘Trade with States not Party to the 
                                                 
23
 ‘The CITES Fort Lauderdale Criteria: The Uses and Limits of Science in International Conservation 
Decisionmaking’ Notes - Harvard Law Review Vol. 114 no.6 (2001)  
24
 Benn, Penelope –Research Assistant, CITES Secretariat, pers. comms 
25
 National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan Project 00011125, Ministry of Urban Affairs and 
Environment, Angola, Legal Deposit no 3002/06, published May 2006 
26
 Schofield, supra note 22 
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Convention’. In terms of Article X,  this trade with non-parties requires only that 
‘comparable documentation’ be issued by the ‘competent authorities’ in the non-Party 
State which ‘substantially comply’ with CITES’s own requirement with regard to permit 
and certificates27. The Convention does not in any way define or quantify the terms 
‘comparable’, ‘competent’ or substantially’. This is a horrifyingly vague provision, and 
lays the Convention open to abuse. Essentially, this provision of CITES allows non-
members with commercial interests, such as Angola, to make scientific determinations 
which should be made by the more objective Scientific Council of the Convention. The 
precise reason why many nations decline to ratify CITES is because their wildlife trade is 
extensive28, or because they simply have more to gain from non-membership and 
membership is viewed as a threat to prospective economic benefits. Whatever the reasons 
behind Angola’s non-membership, the resultant effect is that elephant are protected by 
CITES provisions until they cross the Angolan border, whereupon these provisions cease 
to operate, unless other legal instruments exist which will take the place of such 
provisions. Conversely, if Angola does formalise its putative membership of CITES, it 
will be the only country of the KAZA TFCA member states that does not form part of the 
‘consumptive use bloc’. 
 
The consequence of the collective pressure of the Consumptive Use Bloc was not in fact 
a general downlisting of elephant to Appendix II, but an exemption which in theory 
allows limited trade in elephant products. The practical legal effect of this exemption is 
similar to that of a downlisting for these specific countries, or a reservation in terms of 
Article XXIII. In terms of Article XXIII however, specific reservations must be entered at 
the time of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession. The political effects of the 
exemption were those of damage to the credibility of CITES as an effective organisation. 
Other member states felt that the Convention had been held hostage by the Bloc, and the 
issue became an emotional and divisive one29.  
 
                                                 
27
 CITES, supra. Article X 
28
 Schofield, supra note 22 
29
 Harvard Law Review, supra note 24 
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The relevant strengths and weaknesses of CITES as an instrument of conservation of the 
elephant and of other wildlife must be evaluated both on their own merits and in light of 
the exemption enjoyed by Botswana, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe, and of Angola’s 
non-membership.  
 
Article VIII describes the measures to be taken by the Parties in order to enforce the 
provisions of the Convention and to prohibit trade in specimens in violation thereof. 
CITES is not a self-executing treaty and the responsibility for enforcing its provisions is 
relegated to each Party State30. CITES is consequently implemented differently by each 
party in terms of its own enabling wildlife legislation31. A lack of effective enforcement 
mechanisms is a familiar weakness of international treaties, and CITES suffers further 
from a history of inadequate deterrence to violations of the Convention32.  
 
 
2.4 THE CONVENTION ON THE CONSERVATION OF MIGRATORY SPECIES 
OF WILD ANIMALS (THE BONN CONVENTION, or CMS) 
 
In light of the current trend in Southern Africa towards the establishment of TFCAs33, 
which place emphasis on the restoration of traditional migration routes for wildlife, it is at 
first glance surprising that the Bonn Convention has such poor representation in the 
region. The CMS is unique in that it is the only wildlife convention aimed at the 
protection of individual migratory species. 
 
One of the most well-publicised aims of the KAZA TFCA, as described above, is the re-
establishment of historic migratory routes for Chobe’s bottlenecked elephant population – 
and yet not one of the five countries involved is a party to the Migratory Species 
Convention. As explained above, one of the three primary aims of establishing TFCAs is 
                                                 
30
 CITES article VIII (1) 
31
 Schofield, supra note 22 
32
 Schofield, supra note 22 
33
 Numerous TFCAs such as the Kgalakgadi Trans Frontier Park, the Greater Limpopo Transfrontier 
Conservation Area, the Mapungubwe transfrontier area and the Lesotho Drakensberg transfrontier area 
have been established in the past few years, and many others have recently been proposed 
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the maintenance of biodiversity, and the Bonn Convention is one of the biodiversity 
conventions. The Preamble to the Convention explicitly states that ‘conservation and 
effective management of migratory species of wild animals require the concerted action 
of all States within the national jurisdictional boundaries of which such species spend any 
part of their life cycle’. It is obvious that these principles parallel the intention behind the 
establishment of TFCAs.  
 
The Convention provides for the listing of migratory species on Appendices I or II, 
depending upon their conservation status34, and Parties are required to protect the 
Appendix I species within their own territories, and conclude agreements with 
neighbouring States to benefit migratory species listed on Appendix II. A species may be 
listed on both Appendices35. Range States must provide information on the movement, 
ecology and conservation status of species from either Appendix within their territories, 
and endeavour to suppress illegal taking and to maintain habitats.  Furthermore, the 
Convention contains more effective enforcement mechanisms than many international 
treaties, including CITES36. The five KAZA TFCA countries lie within what is referred 
to as ‘the SADC gap’37; a band of countries which have not acceded to the CMS and 
constitute a significant lacuna in the Convention’s otherwise strong representation in 
Africa. The reason for this gap is presumed to be a reaction from the countries involved 
against the CITES dispute in the 1980’s and 1990’s38, wherein the Southern African 
ivory-producing countries felt that the international convention in issue was adversely 
affecting their national jurisdiction over their own wildlife reserves. Although the issue 
was resolved in terms of CITES and the States involved were given localised 
dispensations, a negative feeling towards similar conventions was engendered, and this 
caused these countries not to become members of the CMS for fear of further 
interference. This attitude, whilst understandable, does beg the question whether these 
countries will now be prepared to tolerate the interference with their national wildlife 
reserves which membership of the KAZA TFCA may necessarily involve. This is 
                                                 
34
 CMS, Articles III and IV 
35
 CMS, Art. IV(2). 
36
 Hepworth, Robert; Secretary-General of the CMS, pers.comms 
37
 Ibid 
38
 Ibid 
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particularly relevant with regard to the very species which brought about the countries 
reluctance to join the CMS in the first place – namely the elephant population.  
 
 
 
 
2.5 THE RAMSAR CONVENTION: 
 
The mission of the Ramsar Convention is the ‘conservation and wise use of all wetlands, 
through local, regional and national actions and international co-operation, as a 
contribution towards achieving sustainable development throughout the world.39‘ The 
significance of Ramsar in terms of biodiversity conservation really depends upon the 
conservation of a network of wetlands, and this significance is undermined by the patchy 
membership of the KAZA TFCA countries and the inconsistent application of Ramsar 
principles within those countries which are Ramsar members. Only Botswana, Namibia 
and Zambia are parties to the Convention, despite the existence of a number of significant 
wetlands within Zimbabwe and Angola which would undoubtedly qualify these States for 
membership. In order to join Ramsar, a State must select at least one national wetland. 
Botswana has selected only one wetland site, the Okavango Swamps, but this is a wetland 
of considerable importance as it is the largest wetland included in the Ramsar Convention 
and is also a significant tourist draw card. Namibia has selected three sites, but none of 
these fall within the KAZA TFCA area. Of Zambia’s three sites, the Kafue Flats site falls 
close to the border of the area (see Figure 1) but is inexplicably not included within it. 
Thus, only one Ramsar sites in included within the KAZA TFCA area , while there are 
potentially several other important wetlands which could have been included, such as the 
Linyanti Swamps area which lies in both Botswana and Namibia, extending for 
approximately 1850 square kilometres40, and several areas of the Zambezi valley. The 
inclusion of these sites would have created a network of protected Ramsar wetlands 
within the KAZA. The concept of a network rather than a number of isolated wetlands is 
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important particularly in terms of migratory birds which act as dispersal agents as they 
travel from one wetland to another along their migration routes, and in this way are vital 
vectors for biodiversity41. All of the five KAZA States suffer habitually from drought, 
which is likely to be exacerbated by climate change in the years to come and may shrink 
the existing network of wetlands even further, reducing the potential for dispersal by 
migratory birds. Once again, the lack of cohesive Ramsar membership and practice are 
not indicative of a multilateral commitment to the maintenance and promotion of 
biodiversity in the KAZA region. Furthermore, the countries which are not party to 
Ramsar are ignoring a potentially important international mechanism which might 
otherwise provide funding and information for conservation of their own wetlands. 
 
 
2.6 CONVENTION CONCERNING THE PROTECTION OF THE WORLD 
CULTURAL AND NATURAL HERITAGE (WHC): 
 
The WHC differs from the other biodiversity conventions in that it is not primarily 
concerned with the maintenance of biodiversity. However, the Convention aims at the 
protection of both cultural and natural heritage, and many of the natural heritage sites 
under the auspices of the Convention are of enormous importance for biodiversity, such 
as Australia’s Great Barrier Reef and the Serengeti plains of Tanzania.  
 
Of the KAZA TFCA countries, only Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe are members of 
the WHC. Party States are encouraged to nominate sites of international cultural or 
natural heritage significance within their territories and then establish management plans 
and set up reporting systems on the state of conservation of their World Heritage sites. 
Again, Botswana has nominated only one site, the minimum for membership of the 
Convention, but this site is the Tsodilo Hills which falls within the KAZA TFCA. Zambia 
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has nominated only Mosi-oa-Tunya/ Victoria Falls, which it shares with Zimbabwe and 
also falls within the KAZA area. Zimbabwe has nominated a total of five sites42. 
 
Whilst it is suggested that this Convention is not as directly relevant to conservation 
within the KAZA TFCA as the other biodiversity conventions, it is also apparent that it is 
under-utilised. There is no reason, for instance, that the Okavango Delta should not be a 
World Heritage Site. The mission of the WHC includes such laudable aims as the 
‘participation of the local population in the preservation of their cultural and natural 
heritage’ and the encouragement of ‘international cooperation in the conservation of our 
world’s cultural and natural heritage’. These are, once again, aims which parallel the aims 
of the TFCA.  
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3.  LEGISLATION AT THE REGIONAL LEVEL 
 
3.1 THE AFRICAN CONVENTION ON THE CONSERVATION OF NATURE 
AND NATURAL RESOURCES (THE ALGIERS CONVENTION): 
 
This Convention entered into force in June of 1969 and had 53 member States as of June 
23rd 200643. As the Convention has now been in force for over 30 years and is seen by 
some as outdated, the African Union has drafted a revised Convention in order to bring 
the provisions up to date with recent international environmental conventions and 
evolution and progress in international environmental law. However, the revised Protocol 
has yet to come into force. 
 
The original Convention was drafted at a time when many African countries had only 
very recently acquired their political independence, and was also unique amongst 
international treaties in that it was the first to consider the natural environment of an 
entire continent44. It is interesting to note that the Preamble of the Convention, although 
drafted nearly 40 years ago, refers to the principles of sustainable utilization (‘Accepting 
that the utilization of the natural resources must aim at satisfying the needs of man 
according to the carrying capacity of the environment’). The ‘Fundamental Principle’ of 
the Convention is described in Article II, which provides that: ‘The Contracting States 
shall undertake to adopt the measures to ensure conservation, utilization and development 
of soil, water, flora and faunal resources in accordance with scientific principles and with 
due regard to the best interests of the people’. Thereafter, the Convention sets out the 
measures to be taken by individual countries in respect of various categories such as 
Soil45, Water46 and Flora47. Of particular potential relevance to the establishment of the 
KAZA TFCA are the provisions relating to Faunal Resources48, Protected Species49, 
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Conservation Areas50 and Interstate Co-operation51. A list of Protected Species is 
annexed to the Convention, but the African Elephant is not included in this list. 
 
Although the Algiers Convention could potentially have influenced the evolution of 
conservation practices in all five of the KAZA TFCA Member States, only Botswana and 
Zambia had signed, ratified or acceded to the Convention as of July 23rd 200652. Both 
countries were original signatories in 1968, but only Zambia has since ratified and 
deposited her signature to the Convention. This is despite the passage in the Preamble of 
the KAZA TFCA MoU which provides that ‘Member States seeking to establish this 
Transfrontier Conservation Area are Parties to and/or signatories of the African 
Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources’. For this reason, the 
Algiers Convention cannot be said to be particularly pertinent to the creation of the 
KAZA TFCA. However, an opportunity still exists for the Member States to accede to 
the Convention, which would mean that they acceded to the revised version of the 
Convention drafted in Maputo in 2003. 
 
The Revised Convention is a much longer document than the original. The categories 
which are addressed have been increased and their contents expanded upon to reflect 
developments in conservation and environmental policy and law. Rather than the single 
Principle stated in the original document, the revised version contains a passage outlining 
the Objectives of the Convention53 and also an Article containing the Principles which 
shall guide the Parties in ‘taking action to achieve the objectives of this Convention and 
implement its provisions’54. The principles of sustainable development are emphasised 
throughout, and it is expressed that all peoples have an actual right to a ‘satisfactory 
environment favourable to their development’55. The revised Convention is a detailed and 
thorough document containing scientifically sound principles and practices for 
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conservation and sustainable use in a wide range of areas such as Vegetation Cover 
(Article VIII) and Species and Genetic Diversity (Article IX). The provisions on Species 
and Genetic Diversity, Conservation Areas (Article XII), Sustainable Development and 
Natural Resources (Article XIV) and on Traditional Rights of Local Communities and 
Indigenous Knowledge (Article XVII) are particularly relevant to the principles 
underlying the creation of the KAZA TFCA. Article XXII deals with co-operation 
between the Parties and encourages such Parties to co-operate in giving effect to the 
provisions of the Convention, to harmonize their policies and laws and to consult on 
activities which may have transboundary implications. In particular, Article XXIII(2)(e) 
provides that ‘whenever a natural resource or an ecosystem is transboundary, the Parties 
concerned shall undertake to cooperate in the conservation, development and 
management of such resource of ecosystem and if the need arises, set up interstate 
commissions for their conservation and sustainable use;’.  
 
Adherence to the principles contained in the Revised Convention would ensure that the 
Member States of the KAZA TFCA had a common approach to conservation and 
sustainable utilisation practices in the creation of the TFCA. Furthermore, the revised 
document requires 15 signatures to come into force. The Member States could provide 
one third of these signatures and, through cooperation, become a potentially significant 
influence as a bloc on the future of conservation on the African continent.   
 
 
3.2 THE PERMANENT OKAVANGO RIVER BASIN AGREEMENT: 
 
The Okavango River arises in Cuanda Cubango, Angola, and then flows through Namibia 
before reaching Botswana and spreading out to form the fan-shaped delta (apart from 
periodic outflows to the Chobe channel which links to the Zambezi basin). The Okavango 
River Basin remains one of the least human-impacted basins on the African continent56  
but mounting socio-economic pressures from the three riparian countries threaten to 
                                                 
56
 United Nations – Integrated management of the Okavango River Basin: 
http://esa.un.org/techcoop/flagship.asp 
  
27 
change its present character. It has been predicted that over time this change could result 
in irremediable environmental breakdown, and it was to this end that the Permanent 
Okavango River Basin Commission was established in September 1994. The purpose of 
this commission is to assist the three countries which share the Okavango River Basin in 
maintaining the domestic and global benefits of the basin by establishing agreement over 
the sharing of these benefits and associated liabilities through joint management of the 
basin’s water resources. These liabilities include those of an environmental and 
ecological nature. The Commission consists of one delegation from each Contracting 
Party, each of which comprises not more than three members, although extra advisors 
may be appointed57. In terms of Article 1.2, the objective of the Commission shall be to 
act as technical advisor to the Contracting Parties (and perform such other related 
functions as may be assigned to it). The various functions of the commission are 
described in Article 4, and these include advising the Contracting Parties on measures 
related to sustainable water yield, prevention of pollution and measures to combat water 
shortages. Whilst three of the five KAZA TFCA Member States are Contracting Parties 
to the OKACOM Agreement, it seems that there is little direct overlap between the 
provisions of the Agreement and the KAZA TFCA MoU. The Agreement provisions 
relate directly and solely to the utilization of the waters of the Okavango Basin, and echo 
the principles of sustainable utilization in consonance with the provisions of the MoU. 
Furthermore, the contents of the OKACOM Agreement promote the principle of 
transfrontier cooperation58 and may be instrumental in forging additional transboundary 
links between the three parties involved. 
 
 
3.3 THE SADC WILDLIFE PROTOCOL: 
 
The most important regional instrument for conservation which operates within the 
KAZA TFCA area is the SADC Wildlife Protocol, which has been adopted as the basic 
                                                 
57
 Article 2 
58
 This principle is repeated throughout the Preamble of the OKACOM Agreement 
  
28 
platform for regional cooperation and integration in wildlife management59. All five of 
the KAZA countries are members of the Protocol, which was drafted in 1999 and came 
into force in November of 2003. Two crucial aspects are identified in the Protocol to 
guide regional cooperation and integration in wildlife management – namely the 
establishment of common approaches to the conservation and sustainable use of wildlife 
resources, and an emphasis on the effective enforcement of laws governing the use of 
wildlife resources60. 
 
The SADC website emphasizes that there must be a compromise between consumptive 
and non-consumptive use of wildlife. Conventional protected area management is 
acknowledged, but the need for community-based wildlife management resources is 
also stressed. The major challenge described is to develop policies, legislation and 
institutional structures that recognize wildlife as a viable land-use option, and allow 
community based management and beneficiation from wildlife resources61, and this is 
essentially the challenge that the Protocol seeks to address. 
   
  
The preamble to the Protocol immediately addresses the issue of sovereignty. It holds that 
States have ‘the sovereign right to manage their wildlife resources’, but this is 
immediately qualified by the consecutive statement ‘and the corresponding responsibility 
to sustainably use and conserve these resources’.  This qualification is unusual and 
interesting. Whilst many conventions emphasise the notion of responsibility, especially 
with regard to biodiversity conservation, it is perhaps surprising to find a qualification of 
the concept of absolute sovereignty in such a prominent position in an international 
convention. The concept of limitation of sovereignty recurs frequently throughout the 
Protocol, albeit in veiled form, as the text refers frequently to collective or cooperative 
action and collaboration.  
 
The Preamble holds that the viability of wildlife resources in the region ‘requires 
collective and cooperative action by all SADC Member States’, and also that ‘regional 
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management’ of wildlife is necessary to promote awareness of wildlife’s socio-economic 
value and enable equitable distribution of benefits derived from wildlife. The Preamble 
further acknowledges the need for cooperation among the SADC States in law 
enforcement, information-sharing and capacity-building, and finally expresses an 
intention to ‘establish a common framework for the conservation and sustainable use of 
wildlife resources in the SADC region and to assist with the effective enforcement of 
laws governing those resources’.  The Preamble also refers to the several international 
instruments as well as several regional agreements, such as the ‘Master Plan for the 
Security of Rhino and Elephant in Southern Africa’.  The emphasis on cooperation and 
information-sharing is undermined by an error in this section however. The text 
recognises that all SADC Member States are signatories to CITES, when Angola is in 
fact not a party to CITES62. This discrepancy is an oversight with particularly serious 
implications63. 
 
Article 3 of the Protocol is entitled ‘Principles’ and exhorts State Parties to ensure the 
conservation and sustainable use of wildlife resources under its jurisdiction. It further 
states that ‘Each State Party shall ensure that activities within its jurisdiction or control do 
not cause damage to the wildlife resources of other states or in areas beyond the limits of 
national jurisdiction.’ This is potentially an extremely important statement with regard to 
TFCAs in general and to transboundary wildlife conservation in particular. It is debatable 
whether wild animals can be considered to be the wildlife resources of State B when they 
are within the territorial jurisdiction of State A, even if they originated in State B.  
However, if this is not the case, it can further be argued that interference with a 
commercially valuable wildlife species (such as elephant) within a country’s jurisdiction 
could be construed as causing damage in areas beyond the limits of that country’s 
jurisdiction, assuming that the population in question habitually migrates across national 
borders. The effective import of the statement is essentially one of protection for 
migratory species. 
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Article 4 deals with the attainment of the principles referred to in Article 3, and places an 
enormous amount of emphasis on cooperative action and collaboration. In terms of 
Article 4(1)(b), States are required to develop ‘common approaches’ to the conservation 
and sustainable use of wildlife. 4(1)(c) requires collaborative action to achieve the 
objectives of international agreements to which the States are party. This provision lacks 
impact in the light of the inconsistent membership and inadequate application of relevant 
international agreements, as described above in Chapter 2. Article 4(2)(c) is directly 
relevant to TFCAs and provides that States are required to ‘cooperate with other Member 
States to manage shared wildlife resources as well as any transfrontier effects of activities 
within their jurisdiction or control.’  Whilst the term ‘cooperate’ is not defined and 
therefore probably too vague for direct enforcement, the intention underlying the 
provision is clearly to promote transboundary management of wildlife resources.  
 
Article 5 contains the objectives of the Protocol and is particularly relevant with regard to 
TFCAs. In terms of Article 5(1), the Protocol’s primary objective is to ‘establish within 
the Region and within the framework of the respective national laws of each State Party, 
common approaches to conservation and wildlife resources and to assist with the 
effective enforcement of laws governing those resources.’  These ‘common approaches’ 
would be indispensable in the establishment of any TFCA, and this is borne out by the 
specific objectives described in Article 5(2). Article 5(2)(b) requires the harmonisation of 
the relevant legal instruments, while Article 5(2)(f) refers specifically to the 
‘conservation of shared wildlife resources through the establishment of transfrontier 
conservation areas’. 
 
Article 7 deals with ‘Legal Instruments for the Conservation and Sustainable Use of 
Wildlife’. Article 7(2) is particularly pertinent to TFCAs as it requires States Parties to 
harmonise national legal instruments relating to conservation and sustainable use of 
wildlife. The subsections of 7(2) then specify in detail what areas of legislation should be 
standardised. These include issues such as the protection of wildlife species and their 
habitats and measures governing the taking of wildlife. ‘Taking’ is comprehensively 
defined in Article 1 so as to include most activities which would impact negatively on 
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wildlife, and the cumulative effect of these provisions is therefore to require consistent 
standards with respect to wildlife management. 
 
Article 8(5)(a) provides that States Parties should establish programmes and agreements 
to promote cooperative management of wildlife resources and habitats across 
international borders. In this respect, the Protocol operates as a framework document, 
providing for the establishment of documents such as the MoU of the KAZA TFCA 
discussed below. The same framework structure is apparent in Article 9, which provides 
for the establishment of a regional database on the status and management of wildlife64. 
In terms of Article 9(2), the Wildlife Sector Technical Coordinating Unit (WSTCU)65 
shall coordinate and develop standard methodologies for wildlife inventories. Such 
database and inventories would be vital in transboundary wildlife resource management. 
 
Article 10 requires States Parties to ensure effective enforcement of wildlife legislation 
within their own territories, and also particularly in ‘trans frontier contexts’66. The means 
of such transfrontier enforcement are then elaborated upon. 
 
From the Articles described above, it is readily apparent that the SADC Wildlife Protocol 
is committed to the promotion of transfrontier initiatives. It emphasises cooperation and 
collaboration between States repeatedly throughout. The real strength and value of this 
instrument however, is found in Article 13, which contains the Sanctions provisions. 
Article 13 provides for the imposition of sanctions against State Parties which fail to 
fulfil their obligations67, or even implement policies which undermine the objectives and 
principles of the Protocol68. This is something of a triumph when one considers that the 
greatest weakness of many international instruments is their lack of enforceability and 
sanctions for non-compliance. This increased enforceability is one of the greatest 
advantages of a regional instrument as opposed to an international instrument. 
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4. LEGISLATION AT THE DOMESTIC LEVEL 
 
 
4.1 Angola 
 
Since the end of the bloody civil war in the area, Angola’s body of environmental and 
conservation law has increased dramatically, as has her implementation of existing laws. 
The country is presently preparing a National Environmental Management Programme 
(NEMP) which is aimed at defining the priority areas for the conservation and sustainable 
use of natural resources. In the absence of this piece of legislation, as well as the absence 
of a National Environment Policy, sectoral strategies are currently being developed. The 
legal framework of Angola comprises a number of varying sectoral environmental laws 
in the fields of land, fisheries, mining, petroleum and water resources. Some laws 
relevant to biodiversity and Protected Areas still applicable in Angola were produced 
during the colonial era and are urgently in need of review and updating69. The Ministry of 
Urban Affairs and Environment has launched a National Biodiversity Strategy and Action 
Plan (NBSAP), in terms of which the country undertakes to carry out a series of actions 
towards the implementation of the Convention on Biological Diversity. For the 
development of this strategy, a number of thematic studies were developed that present 
an overview of the status of biodiversity in Angola. The thematic studies represented 
areas such as terrestrial biodiversity, environmental legislation, demographic and socio-
economic standards, sources of information and traditional knowledge, and therefore 
correspond intimately with the aims of the KAZA TFCA project. The overall objective of 
the National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan is: ‘To incorporate measures for the 
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity and fair and equitable sharing of 
biological resources into development policies and programmes for the benefit of all 
Angolans.’70. 
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Priorities are defined in order to facilitate the implementation of the Strategy, and these 
priorities are grouped into eight separate but complementary strategic areas. The Angolan 
Constitution contains several provisions that promote environmental protection and 
reflect the need to evolve measures and strategies for the protections of natural resources 
in Angola71 and the Strategy aims to meld compliance with these provisions with an 
equivalent response to Article 112 of the Constitution which stipulates that the 
government is obliged to ‘elaborate and promote the execution of the economic and 
social development of the country’. 
 
Various legislative instruments of Angola are targeted at sustainable development and 
environmental protection, and the Environment Framework Law is, in the absence of a 
National Environment Management Programme, the overarching document which is 
intended to inform all environmental legislation in Angola and sets out guiding principles 
for such legislation. In terms of Article 3 of the Environment Framework Law, the 
government shall ensure the implementation of strategies and measures aimed at 
guaranteeing citizens the ‘right to live in a healthy environment and the benefits of the 
rational utilization of the natural resources of the country.’  
 
After the publication of the Environment Framework Law, the production of 
environmental legislation in the country increased considerably, but a lack of clear 
sectoral policies and strategies still exists, and the existing environmental legislation is 
poorly applied. The institutional framework situation differs from the other KAZA TFCA 
countries, in each of which a single ministry is responsible for tourism and conservation 
or wildlife. In Angola, the administration of environmental affairs is controlled by the 
Ministry of Urban Affairs and Environment, and tourism activities fall under the Ministry 
of Hotels and Tourism.  
 
According to the National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan, the current protection 
measures for protected areas have not been efficient, and in some cases have been non-
existent, due to the long period of instability in the past and to the needs of the growing 
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population. The weakness of the administrative system of the existing parks and reserves 
is widespread, and exacerbated by lack of infrastructure and guards. This does not bode 
particularly well in terms of the inclusion of Angola in the KAZA TFCA, but the 
National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan does include ‘Biodiversity Management 
in Protected Areas as one of the eight Strategic Areas, and this suggests a shift in attitudes 
in Angola. Objective C.4 requires that the country ‘Establish a national integrated 
management system which allows the reconciliation of the conservation and sustainable 
use of biodiversity and tourism with the interests of local communities’. Whilst neither 
this objective nor others in the relevant Strategic Area mention transfrontier conservation 
specifically, the principles which are voiced do reflect those underlying the creation of 
the KAZA TFCA, and this suggests compatibility between the two schemes. Several 
other objectives and Strategic Areas are also relevant, such as Objective E, which 
requires government to ‘Strengthen the role of rural communities in the sustainable use of 
biodiversity in Angola and in decision-making in this regard’ and the Institutional 
Strengthening which comprises Strategic Area F and mandates vocational capacity 
building such as that of poaching guards and forest rangers. A provision particularly 
relevant to the KAZA TFCA and its elephant population is Objective C.4.2, which 
requires that the country ‘Implement a moratorium banning activities of hunting of big 
and medium-sized mammals and other endangered species in protected areas until such a 
time that the animal populations are sufficiently recovered’. Furthermore, Objective 
D.5.2 specifically requires the implementation of a ‘permanent ban on the hunting of 
endangered species (outside the protected areas) and contained in national and 
international red lists, such as the black giant sable antelope, gorilla, elephant (my 
underlining) and chimpanzee.’ Whilst it remains to be seen whether these objectives will 
be implemented and given the force of law in Angola, it is clear that the intentions which 
will support the creation of the KAZA TFCA are present. 
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4.2 Botswana 
 
The Botswana government has developed over twenty-five separate laws related to 
resource management issues, as well as a host of national policies72 but there is presently 
no comprehensive or consolidated environmental statute in Botswana. As described 
above73, Botswana is also a signatory to a number of international environmental 
agreements. However, implementation of such multilateral agreements has in general 
been poor74, and the numerous government policies on sustainable resource use75 do not 
have the force of law. Furthermore, the process of effective environmental governance is 
hampered by a marked degree of fragmentation in that different pieces of legislation often 
fall under different government departments and authorities76. This creates both gaps and 
overlaps in both competency and implementation. Observance and enforcement of 
environmental laws are weak, due primarily to a lack of institutional and human 
resources77.  
 
Botswana’s Constitution contains no reference to either environmental or conservation 
matters, which is in contrast with constitutional developments in other African States78. 
 
The legal instruments most relevant to conservation in Botswana’s portion of the KAZA 
TFCA area, are the 1990 National Conservation Strategy and the 1986 Wildlife 
Conservation Policy. The National Conservation Strategy is one of the measures taken to 
implement the Convention on Biodiversity79 and is intended to demonstrate Botswana’s 
commitment to sustainable development. The Botswana government has identified 
                                                 
72
 UNDP Botswana website: http://www.unbotswana.org.bw/undp/environment/htm 
73
 See Chapter 2: International Instruments 
74
 Desire, Rubadiri ‘Implemenation of International Environmental Agreements: The Case of Botswana’. 
Presented at the Seventh International Conference on Environmental Compliance and Enforcement 
(http://www.inece.org/conference/7/vol1/39_Rubadiri.pdf) 
75
 For example, the National Policy on Natural Resource Conservation and Development (1990) 
76Botswana National Conservation Strategy Action Plan Consultancy, Executive Summary, Volume 5: 
Legislative Reforms and Provisions 
77
 Botswana National Conservation Strategy Action Plan Consultancy, ibid 
78
 For example: the right to environment contained in the Bill of Rights of South Africa’s 1994 
Constitution. 
79
 National Report on Measures Taken to Implement the Convention on Biological Diversity: Presented at 
the fourth Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biodiversity 5th – 15th May 1998 
(http:boleswa97.tripod.com/mosothwane.htm) 
  
36 
primary and development goals of the strategy. The primary goals are to pursue policies 
and measures to integrate the work of sectoral Ministries and interest groups throughout 
Botswana, and to increase the effectiveness with which natural resources are used and 
managed. There are several development goals which are relevant to the aims of TFCAs. 
These include the development of multiple rather than single purpose natural resource-
uses, and the development of links with neighbouring countries in conserving natural 
resources. Despite the existence of the National Conservation Strategy Agency, which 
includes senior government officials and university professors as members and is chaired 
by the Minister of Environment, Wildlife and Tourism, the Strategy has failed to 
harmonise existing environmental legislation, integrate environmental issues into the 
constitutional framework, or even to persuade government to promulgate any kind of 
National Environmental Management Act or Environmental Impact Assessment Act. 
There is therefore a dearth of institutional mechanisms which would allow compliance 
with international and regional environmental instruments to be enabled domestically. 
The Agency is ineffectual as a result of a lack of a firm political and legislative 
foundation establishing it as a national administrative body, and this lack in turn calls into 
question the national intent and capacity to comply with the Strategy’s objectives80. 
 
The Wildlife Conservation Policy allows for the management and utilization of wildlife 
resources and is intended to manifest the government’s recognition of the role that 
wildlife plays in the sustainable development of the country’s economy. Again, the 
instrument is purely a policy document, and suffers from a lack of enforceability and 
implementation.  
It can thus be seen that the two most important national framework instruments regulating 
Botswana’s conservation and wildlife policies in terms of the KAZA TFCA  are 
unenforceable policy documents which have done little to harmonise and integrate the 
country’s fragmented and incoherent multitude of environment-related instruments.  
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4.3 Namibia 
 
Namibia was one of the most ardent proponents of the consumptive use of ivory, and 
instrumental in achieving the CITES down-listing which allowed certain SADC countries 
to export raw ivory81. This policy of sustainable utilisation of wildlife resources (rather 
than preservation) underlies the bulk of Namibian conservation instruments. This is 
illustrated by an emphasis on the control in trade of restricted products such as elephant 
ivory and rhino horn, and regulation of the wildlife industry by means of a permitting 
system. The Namibian Ministry of Environment and Tourism attempts to ensure the 
sustainability of such utilisation by means of scientific research and monitoring and the 
provision of specialist technical advice to any ministerial instrument involved in resource 
management and conservation issues82. 
The environmental legislation inherited by Namibia upon her Independence was 
outdated, fragmented and incomplete, and the Ministry has consequently embarked upon 
a programme of revision and review of existing environmental legislation in order to 
establish an appropriate environmental legislation framework in Namibia83 
 
Several draft legislative instruments have been prepared which are relevant to the 
creation of the KAZA TFCA, including the Environmental Management Act and the 
Parks and Wildlife Management Act. Essentially, Namibia has undertaken a 
comprehensive, consultation-based reform of the Ministry’s policy framework for 
wildlife production and utilisation in support of biodiversity conservation and economic 
development and the results of this are to be reflected in the Parks and Wildlife Act 
which will which replace all existing legislation dealing with these areas. In a related 
theme, Namibia has been involved since 1990 in devising mechanisms for returning 
benefits from natural resources such as wildlife to rural communities, and the Nature 
Conservation Ordinance of 1975 was amended so as to allow communities to have rights 
to manage and earn income from wildlife similar to those currently enjoyed by 
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commercial farmers on their land84. Namibia’s practical approach to wildlife as a 
commercially valuable resource appears to be successful; the contribution of wildlife 
production and utilisation to her GDP amounted to more than N$250 million in 1998 and 
was awarded the ‘Gifts of the Earth’ award by the World Wide Fund for Nature in 
199985.  
 
  
 
 
 
4.4 Zambia 
 
Zambia has approximately ten different environmental laws86, but only one of these is 
directly relevant to the creation of the KAZA TFCA, namely the Zambia Wildlife Act No 
12 of 1998. The Act establishes the Zambia Wildlife Authority and defines its numerous 
functions. Many of these functions relate to the establishment of the TFCA, such as the 
establishment, control and management of national parks and the conservation and 
enhancement of wildlife ecosystems and biodiversity, the promotion of opportunities for 
the equitable and sustainable use of the special qualities of national parks, the sustainable 
use of wildlife and the effective management of the wildlife habitat in game management 
areas and the involvement of local communities in the management of game management 
areas. The Act places an emphasis on the involvement of local communities throughout – 
although it vests the ownership of all wild animals in the President, the administration 
and management of all natural parks, sanctuaries and wildlife management areas is to be 
shared with local communities. Specifically, local communities resident or with special 
interest in game management areas may be registered as Community Resources Boards 
which are then empowered to co-manage such areas and establish a fund from the 
proceeds for the benefit of the economic and social well being of the rest of the 
community. Zambia has always been progressive with regard to community-based 
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wildlife projects, and a number of these have been implemented in various fields, such as 
anti-poaching, with positive results87. 
 
Of particular relevance to the wildlife within the KAZA TFCA is the provision of the 
Wildlife Act which empowers the Minister, in consultation with the Wildlife Authority 
and on the advice of any board, to specify any wild animal as a game animal or protected 
animal and in like manner specify any game animal as a protected animal. Furthermore, 
the Act authorises any person who has reasonable grounds to believe that any proposed or 
existing government activity, or activity of any other organisation or person which may 
have an adverse effect on any wildlife species or community in a national park, game 
management area or open area, to request the Authority that a wildlife impact assessment 
may be conducted. 
 
 
4.5 Zimbabwe 
 
Zimbabwe’s environmental legislation is dominated by the Environmental Management 
Act, which was updated very recently (on March 25th 2006). Other relevant Acts include 
the Natural Resources Act and the Forest Act. The Environmental Management Act 
refers to the protection of biodiversity and the principles of sustainable utilisation, as well 
as to Zimbabwe’s obligations in terms of international conventions, but it is the country’s 
Parks and Wildlife Act which is more directly relevant to the establishment of the KAZA 
TFCA. The Act was introduced in 1975 and had the important effect of transferring some 
aspects of state ownership of wildlife to private landowners. 
 
The 1990’s were a period during which Zimbabwe repeatedly demonstrated her 
commitment to environmental protection, both through participation in and domestic 
enforcement of international instruments such as Agenda 21 and through the analysis and 
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addressing of local issues such as land degradation88. Community participation in wildlife 
management was successfully addressed during this period, particularly by innovative 
projects such as CAMPFIRE89 (now defunct). However, political upheaval in Zimbabwe 
during the past few years, combined with massive inflation and a number of enforced 
evictions, has led to widespread poverty and chaos in the country. Commercial farmland 
set aside for wildlife amounted to 27000 sq kms in 199090, but most of this has been 
stripped of wildlife during the past few years. Many formerly pristine national 
conservation areas such as Hwange National Park have also been severely degraded by 
Zimbabweans pillaging the area for food. Little progress in enforcement or development 
of environmental legislation can be made in such an atmosphere. The tourist industry in 
Zimbabwe has virtually collapsed91 and one of the chief advantages to Zimbabwe of the 
creation of the KAZA TFCA may be the ‘dilution’ of the negative connotations presently 
associated with the country in the minds of foreign tourists. 
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5. An Analysis of the KAZA TFCA MoU 
 
5.1 Introduction to the MoU 
 
The MoU for the KAZA TFCA was signed by all five countries at Victoria Falls on 
December 7th  2006. The document represents an agreement to establish the TFCA, and 
will be automatically terminated upon the coming into force of the Treaty92 which will 
formally establish the TFCA and is expected to be signed in 2010.  Despite the fact that it 
is to be eventually superseded, the MoU is a vitally important document. It establishes the 
common intent of five separate countries to co-operate in the establishment of the TFCA, 
but is also more significant than a mere statement of intent. In terms of Article 2, the 
MoU ‘seeks to establish and develop a Transfrontier Conservation Area which is to be 
called the Kavango–Zambezi Transfrontier Conservation Area (KAZA TFCA).’ It is 
therefore apparent that while the Treaty of 2010 is to mark the formal or de legis 
establishment of the TFCA, the signature of the MoU in 2006 represented a form of de 
facto establishment, and furthermore the MoU is to operate as a framework document 
guiding the natal process and operational principles of the TFCA. The MoU is to be the 
major instrument governing the achievement of the objectives of the TFCA for a period 
of more than three years. These three years will be crucial to the successful establishment 
of the TFCA, as it is during this period that the area should be established as a coherent 
region with efficient trans-boundary conservation principles in operation, and it is the 
MoU which should be operational in achieving this. A mere statement of intention may 
carry  some weight as a form of moral imperative, but will probably be insufficient to 
mobilise the vast amount of administrative action, political determination and financial 
resource acquisition and distribution that will be required in order to create such an 
enormous TFCA. At an absolute minimum, definite principles and procedures are 
required in order to initiate the process and to illustrate a commitment from the states 
involved that is indicative of more than lip-service. In terms of the MoU document, the 
five countries appear convinced of the putative benefits of establishing the KAZA TFCA, 
but it is also a certainty that these benefits cannot be achieved without a certain amount of 
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financial and political investment from these countries. There are financial implications 
which will inevitably be incurred. Whilst funding for the project seems likely to be 
generous, even the cost to each country of the administrative action required will be 
significant. What is even more likely to be a sticking point however, is the issue of 
sovereignty. Whilst the States involved will be unlikely to formally relinquish any aspect 
of their respective sovereignties in a document such as the MoU, the concrete value of a 
trans-boundary area necessarily governed by common principles will be eroded if there 
does not exist at least a tacit understanding that the principles of absolute sovereignty, 
whilst not formally abandoned, should not be applied in this area. 
 
  
 
 
 
5.2 The Issue of Sovereignty and the Role of Stakeholders 
 
The Preamble to the MoU immediately affirms that the Member States have ‘sovereign 
right over their natural resources’ which is a fairly standard provision and echoes the 
opening paragraph of the Preamble to the SADC Protocol on Wildlife Conservation and 
Law Enforcement93. However, the paragraph continues with the words ‘and the 
corresponding responsibility to conserve and sustainably utilize these resources’. Again, 
this is a repetition of the corresponding passage in the SADC document, and represents a 
veiled qualification of the principle of absolute sovereignty which is encouraging in light 
of the collective aims of the KAZA TFCA. The specific responsibilities mentioned in the 
passage also echo in part the fundamental principles underlying the TFCA concept, 
namely those of conservation and sustainable utilisation.  
 
The second paragraph of the Preamble specifically recognises the ‘legal and other rights 
of stakeholders as major contributors of land and other resources to the Kavango and 
Zambezi River basins’. This recognition is perhaps significant in that it could serve to 
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allay fears in the area that the creation of the TFCA will infringe on existing rights and 
usages of land within the area. However, it is difficult to envisage how such recognition 
might remain unqualified. If every stakeholder within the vast area comprising the KAZA 
TFCA retains exactly the same rights that he or she holds at present, then a question 
arises as to what changes the creation of the TFCA will be making. Even if the 
management structures implementing conservation measures in the region are 
community-based, the existing rights of stakeholders may be impinged upon. 
Furthermore, the use of the term ‘legal and other rights’ (own italicisation) creates a 
potentially extremely broad range of rights which must correspondingly be afforded 
recognition. Exactly which rights are being recognised as rights if they are not legal 
rights? The rights referred to are those of ‘stakeholders’. Stakeholders are defined in 
Article 1 (the Definitions section) as:  
‘individuals or groups of individuals or representative institutions with a stake, direct 
interest in the Transfrontier Conservation Area development and management, such as 
local or district councils; local communities (i.e. groups of people living in or adjacent to 
the TFCA, bound together by social and economic relations based on shared interest);’ 
 
As well as being clumsy, grammatically incorrect and incoherent, this definition is 
extremely broadly phrased. Apparently, anyone with a ‘direct interest’ in the TFCA 
development or management, as well as person or community living in the area is a 
stakeholder. Even those living adjacent to the outer limits of the TFCA area are defined 
as stakeholders, which will necessarily include tens of thousands of people who are not 
actually living within the area. This definition, when coupled with the recognition of legal 
and other rights provision from the Preamble, effectively creates a premise which would 
render the creation of a TFCA unworkable. It is simply not possible to afford recognition 
to all the legal and other rights of such an enormous category of people and then 
effectively implement any conservation measures in the relevant area.  
 
The rights of stakeholders are again referred to in Article 4; the Principles section. In 
terms of Section 4(3), ‘The Member States will respect the rights of stakeholders 
recognizable under National Law and International Law’ and in terms of Section 4(4), ‘A 
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Member State may in terms of its domestic law enter into contractual arrangements with 
stakeholders regarding the protection and regulation of matters affecting such rights.’ 
These first of these provisions is peremptory, while the second is phrased as permissive. 
Member States are compelled, in terms of the MoU, to respect the rights of stakeholders, 
which in this instance are legal rights. Not only domestic law must be considered, but the 
rights of stakeholders in terms of international law must also be considered – which 
would include instruments such as the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) and the corresponding African Charter on Human Rights (Banjul 
Charter). In theory at least, this provision would signify consistent standards of treatment 
being applied to stakeholders throughout the KAZA TFCA area (and those living 
immediately adjacent to it). At first glance, Section 4(4) appears to be a strengthening 
mechanism for the provision above it; a voluntary means of enforcing the respect of 
stakeholders’ rights. However, it is equally possible that the ‘regulation’ referred to might 
involve some compromise of such rights. There are certain obvious examples of rights 
which stakeholders may hold which would potentially be affected by the creation of the 
KAZA TFCA, for instance by the restoration of traditional elephant migration routes in 
particular. 
 
A further issue regarding the definition of ‘stakeholders’ pertains to the use of the phrase 
‘social and economic relations’ as the mechanisms which may bind communities together 
as stakeholders. The paragraph is so incoherently phrased that it is impossible to 
determine absolutely whether the bracketed section is intended as a definition of ‘local 
communities’ or of stakeholders in general, but it seems more likely that it is the former, 
as the bracketed portion is not a logical extrapolation of ‘representative institutions’ and 
does not correspond with ‘individuals’. In light of the conservation-based aims of the 
TFCA, it is perhaps unfortunate that only social and economic relations are referred to, 
whilst no mention of environmental or conservation factors is made anywhere in the 
definition. Presumably, conservation or wildlife groups in the area will be included in 
terms of the definition as stakeholders if they can be said to have a ‘direct interest’ in the 
management and development of the TFCA, but it is disappointing that they are not 
specifically referred to. This is especially true in light of the repeated mention of 
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stakeholders throughout the MoU document. For example, Article 3 which describes the 
geographical extent of the KAZA TFCA holds that the TFCA is to be established by the 
Member States ‘in consultation with their stakeholders’. The scope and methodology of 
such consultation is not specified, but the emphasis is unmistakable. One of the chief 
aims of the TFCA, and the reason for its international appeal is the emphasis on improved 
conservation practice in the area and it would seem appropriate to specifically mention 
consultation with those already involved in such practice. 
 
It is suggested that the definition could be re-phrased as follows: 
 
‘Stakeholders’ means individuals, groups of individuals or representative institutions with 
a stake or direct interest in the Transfrontier Conservation Area development and 
management. This includes, but is not limited to, local or district councils, wildlife or 
conservation interest groups and local communities (which are groups of people living in 
or adjacent to the TFCA who are bound together by social, economic, or other relations 
based on shared interest).’ 
 
Local communities are the most clearly identified group of stakeholders in terms of the 
existing definition in the MoU, and there are several other indications within Article 5 
that such communities are to play an important role in the creation and evolution of the 
KAZA TFCA. There has been criticism of other transfrontier conservation projects for 
paying lip-service only to the role of community development and involvement94 in the 
creation and management of TFCAs, and the Member States of the KAZA TFCA are 
apparently anxious to avoid neglecting community interests. Member States are to 
‘develop mechanisms and strategies for local communities to participate meaningfully in 
and tangibly benefit from the TFCA;’ but the document provides little guidance as to 
what form these mechanisms might assume and there is a danger of this becoming a 
shortfall as it has done in other such projects. ‘Cultural resource management’ is to be 
implemented in terms of Article 5(1)(a) and it is again unclear what such management 
might involve. However, a further objective of the TFCA is to ‘promote alliances in the 
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management of biological and cultural resources and encourage social, economic and 
other partnerships among the Governments and the stakeholders’95, which suggests that 
the cultural resource management in question is to be at least partly community-based. In 
terms of Article 5(2), the Member States may ‘after consultation with stakeholders, agree 
to other objectives’, and this once again indicates the core role that the Member States 
intend the stakeholders to occupy. How meaningful consultation with such an enormous 
category of people from five separate countries could be achieved is not elaborated upon, 
unless it is in the provisions of Article 6.  
  
Article 6, which describes the National Coordinating Agencies, refers again to 
stakeholders, but the relevant passage is incoherent and its import correspondingly 
unclear. Article 6(2) provides that the agency ‘will develop consultative structures to 
enable representation by these stakeholders for the co-ordination of activities leading to 
the establishment of the TFCA’ .The sentence follows Article 6(1) which does not 
mention stakeholders, and the use of the word ‘these’ in Article 6(2) is therefore illogical 
and presumably an error. If the word is omitted, and the word ‘for’ is replaced by ‘in’, the 
section becomes clearer and provides guidance as to the participative role that 
stakeholders are expected to play. Article 6(2) refers only to the establishment of the 
TFCA however, and not to the management thereof once the project is established. 
 
Reference to Article 6 is found in Article 9, which deals with the TFCA Technical 
Committee. In terms of Article 9(1), the Technical Committee will comprise members of 
the National Coordinating Agencies  (which are the Ministries for Environment, Natural 
Resources, Wildlife and/or Tourism for each country96), the TFCA Secretariat and 
‘designated representatives of stakeholders identified through the consultative structures 
provided for in Article 6’. All of the responsibilities of the Technical Committee outlined 
in Article 9(4) deal with the establishment of the TFCA, rather than its ongoing 
functioning and management, which is presumably due to the fact that the MoU will be 
replaced by the Treaty which will contain the ongoing responsibilities of the Technical 
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Committee. Article 9(4)(i) in fact designates one of the responsibilities of the Technical 
Committee as the ‘preparation of a draft management and development plan for the 
TFCA’ and this document may well perpetuate the functioning of the Technical 
Committee. Article 9(4)(f) states that another of the responsibilities of the Technical 
Committee is that of ‘ensuring stakeholder participation in the overall planning and 
establishment of the TFCA’. The inclusion of stakeholders in the Committee should 
ensure that such participation is meaningful, subject to the obvious proviso that the 
‘consultative structures’ referred to in Article 6(2) do ensure a pattern of adequate and 
representative stakeholder participation. The potentially exceptionally wide ambit of the 
term ‘stakeholder’, as described above will necessarily complicate this matter.  
 
Article 9(4)(l) identifies a further responsibility of the Technical Committee as 
‘monitoring activities of stakeholders or institutions in the planning and development of 
the TFCA, in particular but not limited to the field97 of immigration, customs, veterinary 
services, archaeology, cultural resources management, tourism development initiatives 
and security’.  This is significant in terms of governance, as the necessary implication is 
that such monitoring of the activities of stakeholders will theoretically be performed, at 
least in part, by the stakeholders who are members of the Technical Committee. This is 
essentially a form of decentralised governance, and may even be translated as a 
bastardised form of community governance. Another significant feature of this section 
however, is the glaring omission of any mention of any environmental or conservation 
projects. Whilst the words ‘not limited to’ indicate that the list is not an exhaustive one, 
this is nevertheless a striking omission (which is possibly a simple oversight) when this is 
a list of activities or fields in a transfrontier conservation area. It is suggested that the 
term ‘wildlife and conservation services’ should be added to the present list.  
 
In terms of Article 9(3), ‘National and International Conservation and Tourism 
Organizations, or any other body and/or individuals that may advance the objectives of 
the TFCA may be invited to participate in meeting of the Technical Committee either as 
observers or advisors.’ It is not made clear who will be responsible for such invitations, 
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or whether they can be issued unilaterally by individual Technical Committee members 
or must be approved by the body as a whole. However, the intention is clearly to include 
those equipped with relevant and specialist knowledge or training in such meetings and 
benefit thereby. While such observers or advisors will presumably not have any concrete 
say in the decisions and responsibilities of the Technical Committee, the impression 
created is nonetheless one of transparency and a willingness on the part of the Committee 
members to seek advice from those best equipped to provide it. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
5.3 Membership of Regional and International Conventions 
  
The Preamble contains two paragraphs dealing with the Member States’ subscription to 
various regional and international conventions. In terms of the first paragraph, all 
Member States are signatories to the SADC Treaty, the SADC Protocols on Trade and 
Development of Tourism and the SADC Protocol on Wildlife Conservation and Law 
Enforcement. In terms of the second paragraph, member States ‘are Parties to and or 
signatories of the African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural 
Resources (Algiers, 1968), the Convention on the Conservation of Wetlands of 
International Convention (Ramsar Convention, 1971), the World Heritage Convention 
(Paris, 1972), the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild 
Fauna and Flora (CITES) and the Convention on Biological Diversity.’ This provision is 
disturbing, as it suggests a unified system of international convention membership and 
implementation of the common aims contained in such conventions which is simply not 
present in reality. As evident from the table (Figure 2) and discussion above98, Angola 
and Zimbabwe are not members of Ramsar, neither Angola nor Namibia are members of 
                                                 
98
 See Chapter 2, particularly Fig.1 
  
49 
the World Heritage Convention and Angola is not a CITES member. International 
agreements are mentioned again in Article 5(2)(c), where Member States are urged to 
‘collaborate to achieve the objectives of relevant international agreements to which they 
are party’.  This is a principle which would bear far more weight if it related to consistent 
regional membership of a body of international agreements. As illustrated above, the only 
international and regional agreements to which all Member States are party are the SADC 
Wildlife Conservation and Law Enforcement Protocol, and the Convention on 
Biodiversity. Article 11 of the MoU describes the functions of the KAZA TFCA 
Secretariat, and in terms of Article 11(3)(e), one of these functions is to ‘ensure that 
appropriate processes and procedures in planning and developing the TFCA are followed 
in accordance with relevant national laws, regional procedures and international treaties’. 
This planning and development process is one which would presumably be facilitated by 
means of consistent international treaty membership. As international conventions 
generally require domestic implementation of their principles, this consistency would 
result in a trickle-down effect of domestic consistency which would in turn make the 
harmonisation of the Member State’s relevant legislation a far more feasible objective.  
 
5.4 The Twin Aims of Conservation and Tourism 
 
The final paragraph of the Preamble mentions the twin aims of the KAZA TFCA which 
are repeatedly referred to throughout the MoU. The section holds that the Member States 
desire to ‘establish a common framework for the conservation of healthy ecosystems and 
the development of a vibrant and sustainable tourism industry for the benefit of their 
peoples’.  
 
Conservation and tourism are thus the motivating factors for the establishment of the 
KAZA TFCA and this is emphasised throughout the document.  These aims represent a 
slight variation on the traditional three aims of TFCAs – namely conservation, socio-
economic development and the promotion of a culture of peace99. The conservation aim 
is common to both, whilst socio-economic development is more narrowly interpreted as 
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the promotion of tourism, albeit ‘for the benefit of their peoples’100. There is no mention 
anywhere in the document of the ‘promotion of a culture of peace’. This is perhaps 
unsurprising in a region which has not experienced inter-state conflict; presumably, the 
governments involved therefore did not feel it necessary to include such an aim. Article 5 
sets out the Objectives of the TFCA, and similarly contains no mention of the promotion 
of peace, but there is an emphasis on tourism contained within this section also. Cross-
border tourism is to be promoted ‘as a means of fostering regional socio-economic 
development’, and the harmonization of tourism development across international 
boundaries is described as a method of enhancing ecosystem integrity and natural  
ecological processes101, although it is unclear why this should be so. The importance of 
tourism to the creation of the TFCA is again underlined by composition of the National 
Coordinating Agencies designated in Article 6, which shall be comprised of the 
‘Ministries responsible for Environment, Natural Resources, Wildlife and/or 
Tourism..’102. In four of the five KAZA TFCA countries, a single ministry shares 
responsibility for environment/wildlife and tourism, but Angola has separate Ministries 
for these areas103 and  was represented at the signature of the MoU by the Minister of 
Hotels and Tourism104. Whilst the duties of the National Coordinating Agencies are only 
defined with reference to the development of consultative structures enabling 
representation by stakeholders, an examination of article 8 reveals that the composition of 
the Ministerial Committee is identical to that of the National Coordinating Agencies105, 
and the functions of the Ministerial Committee are core activities for the establishment of 
the TFCA. This is elaborated upon further below. 
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5.5 The Geographical Extent of the KAZA TFCA 
 
Article 3 of the MoU describes the geographical extent of the KAZA TFCA. The areas 
which each country will include are mentioned, and illustrated above in Figure 1. The 
map in Figure 1 illustrates the vast size and uneven formation of the TFCA, and 
illustrates also the variety of different natural features and land uses found within the 
target area. In addition to the area described specifically for each country in article 3, 
each Member State is intended to include in the area which they allocate to the TFCA 
‘other land to be determined by migratory movement of wildlife’. This is an interesting 
and unusual provision, and one which is directly relevant to the elephant population 
contained within the TFCA. ‘Wildlife’ is broadly defined in the MoU so as to include 
‘non-domesticated animal and plant life occurring within natural ecosystems and 
habitats’, and the area is home to a number of other migratory species, such as wildebeest 
and numerous bird species, but few if any of these have the economic and political 
importance of the elephant. The expectation created by the inclusion of these provisions, 
which are expressly repeated for every country, is clearly that if the specifically described 
areas are inadequate to allow for a functionally sound geographical expansion of the 
existing restricted wildlife population, then even more territory will be classified as part 
of the TFCA. Article 3 concludes with a statement to the effect that geographical areas 
defined above for inclusion in the TFCA may be altered by mutual consent of the 
Member States – either by including further areas or by excluding areas previously 
included. It is potentially a measure of the commitment of these states to conservation 
that they should be willing to sign a document allocating as-yet unknown areas and 
quantities of their territories to the TFCA. It is alternatively potentially indicative of a 
certain disbelief in the practical impact of the TFCA creation upon the normal functions 
of statehood in those areas. 
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5.6 Objectives and Principles of the KAZA TFCA 
 
The immediate issue to be resolved or addressed when one considers the concept of the 
KAZA TFCA relates to its enormous size and the ambitious scope of a project which 
intends to introduce some coherent conservation and tourism objectives into an area 
which is so vast and incorporates such a diverse array of land-use policies and 
practicalities. What indications are there in the MoU document of how the objectives ad 
principles are to be achieved? How is the KAZA TFCA actually going to come into 
existence, and what will such existence mean for the people and wildlife living within the 
area and for the tourists visiting the area? 
 
An examination of the Preamble, the Principles106 and the Objectives107 as described in 
the MoU is first required, in order to establish what the implementation of these 
principles and objectives can achieve.  
 
Sovereignty is the first issue addressed in the Preamble, as discussed above, but the 
relevant passage effectively curtails the principle of absolute sovereignty by introducing 
the notion of responsibility over the natural resources involved. In this way, there is some 
qualification of the ‘sovereignty issue’ which has proved a stumbling block throughout 
the evolution of international law, as states are customarily reluctant to relinquish any 
aspect of traditional absolute sovereignty. Some motivation for the existence of the 
KAZA TFCA is found in subsequent paragraphs of the Preamble, which speaks of ‘the 
benefits to be derived from close co-operation and the maintenance of friendly relations 
with each other’ and holds that the ‘conservation and sustainable use of natural resources 
amongst our nations contribute to sustainable economic development and the 
conservation of biological diversity’. The Preamble further acknowledges the ‘need for 
co-operation among the collaborating Member States in managing wildlife and 
developing tourism, in sharing information about wildlife conservation and tourism, and 
in building national capacity within our nations’ and concludes by expressing the desire 
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to establish a common framework for the twin aims of tourism and the conservation of 
healthy ecosystems as discussed above. The Preamble does not contain any guidance as 
to how these ideals contained in this section are to be attained. 
 
It can therefore be seen that while certain fundamental aims of the KAZA TFCA are 
found in the Preamble, this section of the MoU serves really to express the ideals of the 
project rather than to provide any concrete guidance for their achievement. This form of 
rather idealistic mission statement is generally recognised as the function of a Preamble 
and its lack of resolution therefore does not particularly detract from the value of the 
MoU.  
 
Articles 4 and 5 express the Principles and Objectives of the TFCA respectively.  Whilst 
the distinction between these two concepts is not always clear, a principle is generally 
seen as the ‘basic general truth which underlies a subject or system of morality’108 whilst 
an objective is a ‘thing aimed at or wished for; purpose’109. In the specific context of the 
MoU, it seems that the Principles are directed at the activities of the individual Member 
States (e.g: ‘The Member States will respect the rights of stakeholders…’110), whilst the 
Objectives pertain to the general aims of the TFCA and the collective actions of the 
Member States (e.g ‘The objectives of the TFCA are to:- promote cross-border 
tourism…’111 .) 
 
If there is to be any degree of enforceability in the provisions of the MoU pertaining to 
the actions of the Member States therefore, such enforceability will relate to the 
provisions of Article 4. The first principle of the article holds that ‘Each Member State 
shall ensure the protection and management of those parts of the Kavango Zambezi 
ecosystem falling directly under its jurisdiction or control and the development of tourism 
so that activities in one country will not cause any adverse effects in areas beyond the 
limits of national jurisdiction.’ The grammatical inconsistency of this sentence is 
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unfortunate, but the meaning remains clear. However, the statement contained here is 
essentially nothing more than a reiteration of one of the most well-established principles 
of customary international law, as stated in the Trailsmelter arbitration of 1941112, 
namely that the activities of one state should not cause harm to the territory of another. 
As a principle of customary international law, it is enforceable through the usual 
channels, such as arbitration by the International Court of Justice or potentially through 
the SADC Arbitration Tribunal. 
 
The second principle of Article 4 describes three areas wherein Member States are 
required to cooperate ‘pursuant to the attainment of the principles contained in this 
Article’. Article 4(2)(a) describes co-operation at the national level between various 
bodies, as illustrated in Figure 3 below. 
 
 
 
 
Fig.3: National co-operation envisaged in Article 4(2)(a) 
 
Article 4(2)(b) requires Member States to ‘co-operate to develop common approaches to 
natural resources management and tourism development’, while Article 4(2)(c) exhorts 
them to ‘collaborate to achieve the objectives of relevant international agreements to 
which they are party.’ Both of these items are aimed at inter-governmental co-operation 
between Member States. The obvious flaw in Article 4(2)(c), namely the inconsistent 
membership and domestic implementation of the ‘relevant international agreements’ has 
been discussed above and detracts enormously from the significance of this provision. 
                                                 
112
 US v Canada (1941) 3 R.I.A.A 
Government 
Private Sector Communities 
NGOs 
  
55 
The common approaches referred to in Article 4(2)(b) are likely to prove more valuable if 
complied with. A common approach to natural resource management implies that 
previously fragmented ecosystems could be unified, and habitats and traditional 
migration routes restored. However, there are potential implications related to the 
unfettered movement of animals within the area which will also have to be considered. 
The large area and multiple land-use strategy of the KAZA TFCA necessarily mean that 
as well as wildlife a large number of domestic animals live within the area. As well as the 
competition for resources which these livestock represent, a possibility exists that stock 
diseases could be transferred from livestock to wildlife. Problems could be faced within 
the area with respect to foot-and-mouth and similar diseases, and the prospect of infected 
animals being able to cross so many international boundaries conjures up horrifying 
possibilities. An illustration of this, although not one related to fencing and boundaries is 
the current ban on fishing in the entire areas surrounding the Chobe – Zambezi 
confluence which is due to an outbreak of disease in the fish which is believed to be the 
result of increased pollution from a number of new settlements in the Caprivi area113.  
 
A common approach to tourism development could potentially remove many of the 
obstacles faced by tourists in the region at present, such as the current difficulty in 
travelling across so many international borders. Near the confluence of the Chobe and 
Zambezi rivers, a visitor could theoretically enter four countries114 within an hour – as 
illustrated by the border posts in Figure 1. In the current situation however, this putative 
visitor will spend between thirty minutes and an hour at each border post; standing in 
queues, filling in forms and paying various charges, which are often spurious115. Such a 
situation can only be aggravating and discouraging for tourists. In a recent newspaper 
article116, Werner Myburgh of the Peace Parks Foundation is quoted as saying that the 
creation of the KAZA TFCA could be beneficial for tourism in that it would remove the 
necessity for tourists to clear formally through all the international border-posts contained 
within the area. Whilst such an objective would undoubtedly facilitate tourism, the 
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logistics and political implications of allowing unfettered human movement within an 
area the size of the KAZA TFCA and owned by five separate African countries are, at the 
very least, intimidating. The perimeter of the area is not fenced, and the absence of 
internal border controls could have serious implications for refugee and criminal 
movement, for example. Perhaps for these reasons, the MoU does not contain any 
definite proposals as to what the ‘common approaches’ referred to in Article 4(2)(b) will 
actually comprise.  
 
When examined in its totality as the article containing the duties of individual States, 
Article 4 is woefully inadequate. When one considers the import of the phrase ‘pursuant 
to the attainment of the principles contained in this Article’ as used in Article 4(2), the 
necessary implication, as discussed above, is that the co-operation described in the sub-
articles of Article 4(2) is required in order to effect only the principles expressed in 
Articles 4(1), 4(3) and 4(4).  In other words, the various levels of co-operation are 
required in order for countries to ensure the protection and management of ecosystems 
and tourism development within their areas so as not to cause harm in areas beyond their 
jurisdictions (which is required of these countries in terms of international law in any 
event), and in order for these countries to respect the legal rights of stakeholders and 
enter into contractual arrangements with these stakeholders ‘regarding the protection and 
regulation of matters affecting such rights.’ Rights which are recognizable under national 
and international law are legal rights which States have a legal duty to observe and 
respect even in the absence of a document such as the MoU affirming this. Similarly, a 
Member State may act in terms of its domestic law and enter into contracts, whether or 
not this provision is contained in the MoU. This is further borne out by the affirmation of 
sovereignty contained in the first sentence of the Preamble. It can therefore be seen that 
the Principles contained in Article 4 have placed few if any obligations upon the Member 
States. The most significant value of Article 4 lies presumably in its re-iteration of the 
responsibilities of States to manage their ecosystems and tourist industries responsibly 
and sustainably, and to respect the right of stakeholders – and through this re-iteration a 
certain moral pressure accrues. 
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Article 5 sets out the objectives of the KAZA TFCA. The five objectives are contained 
within Article 5(1), while Article 5(2) states that the Member States may agree to further 
objectives, ‘after consultation with stakeholders’. The first objective, Article 5(1)(a) again 
emphasises inter-governmental co-operation between Member States. However, while the 
co-operation referred to in Article 4(2) was required in order to achieve the Principles of 
the TFCA, the co-operation referred to in Article 5(1)(a) is seen as an objective of the 
TFCA itself – in other words, one of the reasons for the TFCA’s creation is the fostering 
of this ‘trans-national collaboration and co-operation among Member States’.  This co-
operation is required in terms of Article 5(1)(a) for the purpose of implementing 
‘ecosystems and cultural resource management…’. This is the first mention in the MoU 
document of ‘cultural resource management’. ‘Cultural Resources’ are defined in Article 
1 as ‘any physical and spiritual property associated with past and present human use, 
cultural activities and history’. This situation, namely that of placing a value upon 
cultural resources and including them as a property to be protected within the context of a 
TFCA is an unusual one, but consistent with the wide scope of the KAZA TFCA. While 
TFCAs and transfrontier parks originally evolved in order to protect wildlife across 
borders, usually by means of excluding people and domestic animals and concentrating 
solely upon wildlife and ecosystem conservation within a defined and often contained 
area, the KAZA TFCA represents a more free-form incarnation of TFCA. The actual 
geographical area of the project is fairly loosely defined, a variety of existing land-use 
regimes are incorporated into the TFCA – including hunting, domestic farming and 
community land, and it seems appropriate that the aims of the KAZA TFCA should also 
extend beyond the traditional TFCA goals of wildlife conservation to include aims such 
as cultural resource protection.  
 
Article 5(1)(b) provides that one of the objectives of the TFCA is to promote ‘alliances in 
the management of biological and cultural resources and encourage social, economic and 
other partnerships among the Government and the stakeholders’. However, the Article 
does not make clear whom these alliances are to incorporate. Potentially, these could 
operate between Governments and stakeholders as do the partnerships subsequently 
referred to, or potentially they have a broader ambit, incorporating, for instance, foreign 
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NGO’s.  The partnerships referred to are explicitly between the Governments and the 
stakeholders, but the language of the passage does not make it clear whether these 
partnerships are also intended to operate in relation to the management of biological and 
cultural resources, or whether Government - stakeholder partnerships are to be 
encouraged in relation to all aspects of the TFCA. This passage is one of the many in the 
MoU let down by a lack of clarity of expression, but the overall impression with regard to 
cultural resource management is that there will be stakeholder (presumably that section of 
the stakeholder category comprising local communities) involvement in such 
management. The degree of stakeholder participation in the management of biological 
resources is also unspecified, but the concept is repeated in Article 5(1)(d) which 
maintains that a further objective of the TFCA is to ‘Develop mechanisms and strategies 
for local communities to participate meaningfully in, and tangibly benefit from the 
TFCA’. Despite the emphasis on this participation supplied by the words ‘meaningfully’ 
and ‘tangibly’, the validity of the provision will only be determined by the effectiveness 
of the mechanisms and strategies referred to, at such time as they are developed and 
implemented. As discussed above, lack of community participation, and a lack of benefits 
accruing to local communities has proved problematic in the past for transfrontier 
conservation areas in Southern Africa117 and it remains to be seen whether these issues 
will be overcome in the KAZA TFCA. 
 
Article 5(1)(c) holds that one objective of the TFCA is to ‘Enhance ecosystem integrity 
and natural ecological processes by harmonizing natural resource management 
approaches and tourism development across international boundaries’ and it is this 
precisely this harmonization of natural resource management approaches which many 
proponents of the KAZA TFCA view as the project’s most important function. The 
creation of the KAZA TFCA will politically unite a number of previously fragmented 
ecosystems in a geographical sense, but this could prove meaningless if the area as a 
whole is not consistently managed – which will obviously require harmonization of 
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management approaches. The actual mechanics of such harmonization will require 
extensive analysis of existing conservation policy and practice before some species of 
multilateral management and action plan (as referred to in Article 9(4)(i) and discussed 
below) can eventually be drafted. It is interesting that harmonized tourism development is 
seen within the context of Article 5(1)(c) as an instrument for the enhancement of 
ecosystem integrity and natural ecological processes, whereas tourism and conservation 
are seen as twin co-existing aims elsewhere in the MoU document. Presumably, the 
function of tourism within this scenario is a fiscal one – the increased tourist attraction of 
the ‘World’s Largest Park118‘ will generate an increase in foreign revenue, a proportion of 
which will support conservation and sustainable ecological practices. 
 
 
5.7 Institutional Framework of the KAZA TFCA 
 
Article 7 of the MoU designates various bodies and gives an overview of their 
composition and functions within this Institutional Framework. The bodies designated are 
the Ministerial Committee, the Technical Committee, the Secretariat and certain Working 
Groups, Task Forces and ‘any other ad hoc Committees that may be established, as and 
when required’119. 
 
The Ministerial Committee is described in Article 8, and functions essentially as an 
overall governing body for the KAZA TFCA. The Ministers designated in Article 6 
(namely the Ministries responsible for Environment, Natural Resources, wildlife and/or 
Tourism) as the Coordinating Agencies are also comprise the membership of the 
Ministerial Committee. Essentially, it seems that the National Coordinating Agencies and 
Ministerial Committees are the same bodies – as they have the same members, and 
Article 6 only provides for one task for the National Coordinating Agencies – that of 
developing ‘consultative structures to enable representation by these stakeholders for the 
                                                 
118
 Gosling, supra note 122 
119
 Article 7(c) 
  
60 
coordination of activities leading to the establishment of the TFCA.’120 The functions of 
the Ministerial Committee, in terms of Article 8(3), are to ‘finalise the draft Treaty to 
establish the TFCA and present the same to their respective Governments’, to ‘be 
responsible for overall policy guidance in the process of establishing the TFC’ and to 
‘monitor progress in the establishment of the TFCA’. These are all tasks which are 
indispensable for the creation of the KAZA TFCA, and illustrative of the importance of 
the role of the Ministerial Committee. The composition and role of the Ministerial 
Committee serves as a reminder that the KAZA TFCA, despite the extensive involvement 
of interest groups such as Conservation International and the Peace Parks Foundation and 
the prospectively massive amount of foreign funding, is a project controlled solely by the 
five governments involved. 
 
The negotiation of the draft Treaty is likely to be a protracted and complex task, and is 
expected to take several years to accomplish121. The Treaty will be drafted by the 
Technical Committee as discussed below, and it is the actual drafting which will be time-
consuming. All the members of the Ministerial Committee are also members of the 
Technical Committee and for this reason, once the negotiation and drafting has been 
achieved, ‘finalization’ should be a relatively simple formality. The draft Treaty agreed 
upon by the Ministerial Committee will then have to be presented to the governments of 
each country for approval, and, eventually, signature. This is the next step in the formal 
creation of the KAZA TFCA, which is expected to occur in 2010122. The Treaty will 
comprise a vital document in relation to the existence of the TFCA, as it will be the 
instrument containing the commitment of the five Member States to conservation and 
tourist development within the area. The weaknesses of the Treaty will become the 
weaknesses of the KAZA TFCA, which makes the task of the Ministerial Committee 
vitally important in this regard. The provisions of Article 8(3)(b) are related to the 
preceding Treaty-drafting provision in that they establish that the Ministerial Committee 
is to be responsible for overall policy guidance during the establishment of the TFCA. 
Overall policy is presumably what will be contained in the eventual Treaty. In terms of 
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Article 8(3)(c), the Ministerial Committee will also be responsible for monitoring 
progress during the establishment of the TFCA. The value of this provision is decreased 
by the fact that it is unsupported by any mention of methodology, relative standards for 
measuring such progress or provision for action in the event of such progress being 
unsatisfactory. 
 
The composition and functions of the Technical Committee are described in Article 9. 
This Committee will comprise, as discussed above, the Members of the National 
Coordinating Agencies, the TFCA Secretariat and certain designated representatives of 
stakeholders123.  From this, it can be seen that the Ministers who solely comprise the 
National Coordinating Agencies in terms of Article 6 and the Ministerial Committee in 
terms of Article 8 will also be members of the Technical Committee. It is therefore not 
surprising that there is some overlap in the functioning of these bodies. Advice in 
achieving the objectives of the TFCA may be provided by interested and informed bodies 
and individuals, in terms of Article 9(3). The functions of the Technical Committee are 
describes at some length in Article 9(4) and it is immediately clear that this Committee is 
responsible for implementing the actual steps and processes which are necessary in order 
to bring the KAZA TFCA into being. Indeed, the first task designated to the Technical 
Committee is the identification of the steps required – in essence the Committee first 
decides what work they will need to do before proceeding with it. Article 9(4)(c) is a 
similar provision, in that the Technical Committee are here required to develop action 
plans for the establishment of the TFCA. In terms of Article 9(4)(i), the Committee is to 
prepare a draft management and development plan for the TFCA, which is presumably to 
provide for the management of the TFCA once it is already established.  
 
The Technical Committee is responsible for the negotiation and drafting of the Treaty for 
the establishment of the TFCA124, which will be a necessarily lengthy and complicated 
process. There are five separate countries involved, all of whom will have to agree with 
the provisions of the draft Treaty and this will undoubtedly involve a lengthy period of 
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discussion and compromise, before the Treaty can be delivered to the Ministerial 
Committee for finalization. Related to the negotiation of the Treaty is the responsibility 
described in Article 9(4)(e) – namely the harmonization of the expectations and aims of 
the Governments with respect to the establishment and management of the TFCA. The 
establishment of a Treaty will not be possible if not preceded by such harmonization, as it 
precisely these shared aims and expectations which the Treaty will express. The Treaty 
appears to be an item of concurrent responsibility for the Ministerial and Technical 
Committees, as is the monitoring function provided for in Articles 8(3)(c) and 9(4)(g) 
respectively. The Technical Committee is also required to translate Ministerial 
Committee decisions into operational guidelines and strategies125 and to prepare reports 
and other documentation for the Ministerial Committee126.  From these items, it seems 
that the Technical Committee is responsible for more practical tasks and implementation, 
while the Ministerial Committee fulfils more of an overseer function. There is also an 
inference that eventual decisions will rest with the Ministers comprising the Ministerial 
Committee. Decisions of the Technical Committee are to be reached by consensus127, but 
the mechanism of such consensus is not described, and it is therefore not possible to 
speculate as to whether a simple majority would prevail in the even of a disagreement. 
Furthermore, although the members of the Technical Committee are designated, the 
membership ratio is not prescribed, and it is therefore unclear whether the Ministers will 
be outnumbered by the other members and vice versa. 
 
Despite the scrupulous designation of various bodies, a closer examination of the Articles 
providing for the institutional framework of the TFCA reveals that the Ministers who 
comprise the National Coordinating Agencies in fact hold ultimate authority for all 
aspects of the establishment and management of the project in almost every respect. 
These Ministers are the only members of the National Coordinating Agencies and the 
Ministerial Committee. They are joined by stakeholders and the TFCA Secretariat to 
comprise the membership of the Technical Committee – but it is they who developed the 
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consultative structures which enabled the representation by these stakeholders128 and it is 
they who appoint the TFCA Secretariat129. The observers and advisors to the Technical 
Committee in terms of Article 9(3) have no right to participate in meetings, but must be 
invited. It is the same Ministers in the guise of the National Coordinating Agencies who 
appoint the representatives who comprise the TFCA Working Groups in terms of Article 
10, and these Working Groups are then required to report to the Technical Committee. 
 
TFCA Working Groups are described in Article 10, which report to the Technical 
Committee130. The responsibilities of these Working Groups comprise ‘representing the 
interests of different sections of society in each country regarding the planning and 
development of the TFCA;’131 as well as ‘collecting information and preparing technical 
reports in pursuance of the objectives of this MoU for Technical Committee132‘133 and 
‘facilitating discussions on matters of mutual interest between the Member States’134. It is 
unclear exactly how the Working Groups will represent the interests of different sections 
of society – i.e whether this will be an actual task of the groups or whether this 
representation will be achieved through a representative membership of the Working 
Groups. Although Article 10(1) provides that the Working Groups ‘shall be composed of 
representatives appointed by the National Coordinating Agencies’, Article 9(4)(d) holds 
that the Technical Committee shall be responsible for ‘setting up Working Groups for 
undertaking specific activities of the TFCA development’ and Article 11(3)(b) provides 
that is the responsibility of the TFCA Secretariat to ‘ensure that an effective TFCA 
Technical Committee and TFCA Working Groups are established with full 
representation…’. It is possible that the genesis of these Working Groups is another area 
of concurrent jurisdiction, or alternatively that there is some confusion surrounding their 
establishment. 
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The Secretariat is established in terms of Article 11(1) in order to ‘promote efficiency, 
coordination and accountability in the TFCA planning and development process’, and 
headed by a Project Coordinator. The functions of the Secretariat are relatively numerous 
and are laid out in the provisions of Article 11(3). In terms of Article 11(3)(b), it is the 
responsibility of the Secretariat to ‘ensure that an effective TFCA Technical Committee 
and TFCA Working Groups are established with full representation, and that a working 
programme focused on achieving the objectives of the TFCA is sustained’. This 
represents a duplication (or even triplication) of the functions of other bodies with regard 
to the establishment of Working Groups, as discussed in the preceding paragraph, and 
furthermore there is provision elsewhere for other institutions, such as the Technical 
Committee, to create programmes to achieve the objectives of the TFCA135. Article 
113(d) provides that the Secretariat is to ‘coordinate the drafting and implementation of 
an effective implementation plan for achieving the objectives of the TFCA, with full 
participation of the relevant stakeholders’, whereas the Technical Committee is already 
obliged to ‘ensure stakeholder participation in the overall planning and establishment of 
the TFCA136‘, develop ‘action plans for the establishment of the TFCA137‘ and prepare a 
‘draft management and development plan for the TFCA138‘. This duplication of function 
is also found elsewhere in the descriptions of the responsibilities of the Secretariat. 
Article 11(3)(c) requires the Secretariat to ‘coordinate the drafting of the Treaty for 
presentation to the Ministerial Committee through the Technical Committee’. As the 
negotiation and drafting of the Treaty is already a responsibility of the Technical 
Committee, it is unclear what form such coordination might assume. The provisions of 
Article 11(3)(e) determine that it is the Secretariat which is responsible for ensuring that 
‘appropriate processes and procedures in planning and developing the TFCA are followed 
in accordance with relevant national laws, regional protocols and international treaties’  
and this is a task fraught with potentially enormous difficulties. There are five suites of 
national laws applicable, a significant number of regional protocols and, as discussed 
above, a matrix of international treaties to which some KAZA TFCA Member States are 
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party and others are not. This morass of legal instruments will have to be thoroughly 
examined and reconciled before concrete strategies for planning and development of the 
TFCA can be embarked upon, and the legal situation in the event of any dispute 
regarding aspects of the area will also have to be determined in the light of this existent 
body of legislation as well as the legal instruments developed specifically for the KAZA 
TFCA. 
 
With the exception of Article 11(3)(i), the remaining tasks assigned to the Secretariat are 
chiefly administrative in nature – such as the provision of management and financial 
progress reports139 and the facilitation of meetings of the other institutional bodies140. 
Article 11(3)(i) however, requires that the Secretariat ‘foster collaboration and linkages 
with other organizations’. With the exception of the provision which allows bodies or 
individuals that may advance the objectives of the TFCA to be invited to participate in 
Technical Committee meetings either as observers or advisors141, this is the only article 
which makes express provision for the involvement of interested parties who are neither 
stakeholders nor Ministers. There are an enormous number of bodies already involved at 
some level with the KAZA TFCA project142 and this number can only increase 
exponentially as the TFCA scheme gathers momentum. This fostering of collaboration 
and linkages will be a complicated and extensive undertaking, requiring a large number 
of skilled personnel in order to be effective. 
 
 
5.8 Financing of the KAZA TFCA 
 
The financing levels required in order to fund a project as wildly ambitious as the KAZA 
TFCA will be enormous, and the administrative logistics similarly taxing. Article 12 of 
the MoU is entitled ‘Financing’ and rather baldly lists three sources ‘for the 
implementation of this MoU’, namely Member State contributions (to be determined by 
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the Ministerial Committee on the recommendations of the Technical Committee), 
donations and contributions from other stakeholders and development partners (with the 
approval of the Technical Committee).  Article 12 does not provide for any consequences 
to attach to non-payment of such contributions. A massive amount of external financing 
will be required, in order to fund a large number of specific projects and activities 
associated with the establishment of the TFCA. The provisions of Article 12 contain no 
indication of the size of the contributions required of the Member States – only that these 
levels will be determined by the Ministerial Committee. The countries involved possess 
divergent levels of wealth, but all are third-world countries with other financial priorities 
and none, with the possible exception of Botswana, can be said to be wealthy. It seems a 
certainty that the contributions of the Member States will not even begin to cover the 
costs of establishment of the TFCA, and therefore that a substantial shortfall will have to 
be provided for by means of the provisions of Article 12(2) and Article 12(3), namely 
donations and contributions from other stakeholders and development partners. Article 12 
makes no attempt to delimit which institutional bodies will be responsible for the 
accumulation and distribution of these funds. In terms of Article 9(4)(k), the Technical 
Committee is responsible for ‘overseeing the administration of funds generated for the 
establishment of the TFCA’ but no reference is made to the actual source of these funds. 
Similarly, two provisions of Article 11 refer to functions of the Secretariat with regard to 
funding. In terms of 11(3)(h), the Secretariat is required to liaise with the Technical 
Committee in ‘identifying activities that would require funding and assist with the 
mobilization of resources’ and to ‘provide regular management and financial progress 
reports’ in terms of Article 11(3)(j). Again, neither of these provisions refers to the actual 
solicitation or acquisition of such funds, unless this is what is referred to by the phrase 
‘mobilization of resources’143 It is suggested that this is an inadequacy of the 
Memorandum. The emphasis on an increased volume of tourism as a primary motivation 
for the establishment of the TFCA is repeated throughout the Memorandum, and the 
putative socio-economic benefits of the scheme are also frequently referred to. These 
factors suggest that the impetus for the Member States to establish the KAZA TFCA is 
substantially financially motivated. This view does not constitute a criticism of such 
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motivation; most African countries simply cannot afford to devote significant financial 
resources to conservation schemes which do not offer substantial returns, and latter-day 
principles of sustainable development uphold this premise. However, stringent attention 
to financial detail will be required in order to avoid foreseeable problems such as 
duplication and corruption; a vigilant and meticulous attitude towards the financial 
management of the creation of the KAZA TFCA should be exhibited from the first and 
the MoU is precisely the document in which such an attitude should be made obvious. 
 
 
5.9 Enforcement of Provisions 
 
The weakness of many international conventions and multilateral treaties is a lack of 
provision for enforcement or, more specifically, provision for the imposition of any kind 
of penalty in the event of non-compliance with the articles and agreements contained in 
such documents. The provisions of the articles of the KAZA TFCA MoU are no 
exception. Scrutiny of the document reveals that not a single provision relates to 
enforcement. Non-compliance with any of the Articles contained in the MoU would 
presumably result in some category of dispute however, and Article 13 is entitled 
‘Settlement of Disputes’. In terms of the provisions of Article 13(1), ‘Any dispute 
between Member States arising out of the interpretation or implementation of this MoU 
will be settled amicably through consultation and/or negotiation between the Parties 
concerned.’ This appears to be an Article of little worth. The ministers comprising the 
Ministerial Committee are responsible for ‘overall policy guidance’144 and the 
finalization of the draft Treaty,145 and decisions of the Ministerial Committee are reached 
by consensus146. Furthermore, these Ministers, as explained above, play a definitive role 
in the membership of all other institutions involved in the creation of the KAZA TFCA, 
and will consequently be instrumental in the creation and approval of every decision 
taken by every institutional body of the TFCA. If issues of dissent arise with respect to 
the interpretation or implementation of the MoU, these issues will necessarily arise as a 
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consequence of a lack of consensus between certain parties, and will therefore not be 
resolvable simply through amicable consultation or negotiation between the Parties 
concerned. 
 
Article 13(2) attempts to provide for such failure to reach consensus, and reads ‘Should 
the aforesaid dispute not be resolved in the manner referred to above, any Party may 
submit the said dispute for arbitration to SADC’. There is no accompanying provision 
wherein the Member States agree to abide by the results of such arbitration, or provision 
for such arbitration to be binding in any way. Effectively, Article 13 does not create any 
enforceability of the provisions of the Memorandum, and in the absence of any 
enforceability, it is questionable whether these provisions are in fact binding upon the 
Member States. The implications of this lack of enforceability are less pronounced than 
they might otherwise be, however, in light of the fact that the provisions of the MoU 
place very few concrete obligations upon the Member States themselves. As discussed 
above, the Principles (Article 4) and Objectives (Article 5) provisions are formulated in 
such a way as to give the appearance of creating obligations but in fact amount to little 
other than widely-phrased statements of intent. The responsibilities of the National 
Coordinating Agencies and the institutions created in terms of Article 7 are rather more 
clearly defined, but it is debatable whether a dispute resulting from the interpretation of 
these duties could be classified as a dispute ‘between Member States’. The resolution of 
such a dispute should instead rather be an administrative manner, adjudicated in terms of 
a system of administrative checks and balances. This system is apparent in some 
instances in the MoU, for instance in the reporting functions of the Secretariat and the 
overall policy guidance of the Ministerial Committee, but may be hampered or indeed 
flawed by the constant re-appearance of the same individuals at every step of the 
institutional framework. 
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The signature of the MoU demonstrates a commitment on the part of the five Member 
States to the establishment of the KAZA TFCA, but the extent and effect of this 
commitment remain to be determined. The MoU is obviously already in force, and the 
issues which emerge as weaknesses or potential weaknesses therein will need to be 
resolved in its succeeding document, the KAZA TFCA Treaty. This chapter is intended to 
identify such areas of weakness and propose how these may be subsequently addressed. 
 
6.1: Participation in International and Regional Conventions: 
 
The Member States’ participation in international conventions related to the objectives of 
the TFCA is disturbing, as the States are generally poorly represented in the biodiversity 
related conventions. Furthermore, at a regional level, the Member States are poorly 
represented in terms of the Algiers Convention. As outlined in the previous chapter, 
several of these conventions contain objectives and mechanisms which would facilitate 
the establishment and management of the TFCA.  
 
In order to address this concern, it is suggested that the forthcoming Treaty contain a 
provision urging the Member States to become members of whichever biodiversity-
related Conventions they have not acceded to, and also exhorting all five States to sign 
the newly amended African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural 
Resources.  
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6.2: Provision for Enforcement and Penalties for Non-compliance: 
 
One of the most striking features of the SADC Wildlife Protocol is the content of Article 
13, which provide for sanctions as a penalty for non-compliance with the provisions of 
the Protocol. This is an unusual feature of an international or regional instrument, as these 
documents normally have to strike a fine balance between containing provisions which 
do not threaten the sovereignty of States and thus prevent them from becoming members 
but are nonetheless not totally ineffectual. In contrast, the Protocol is remarkably firm in 
that it provides for enforceability. This potential for enforceability makes all the 
provisions of the Protocol more binding upon and between its members. The fact that all 
five Member States are signatories to the Protocol indicates that they are prepared to 
accept this level of enforcement and the potential consequences of non-compliance, and 
this is something which should be capitalised upon in the drafting of the KAZA TFCA 
Treaty. 
 
Consequently, it is suggested that the KAZA TFCA Treaty contain an Article similar to 
Article 13 of the SADC Protocol, providing for penalties in the event of non-compliance 
with the provisions of the Treaty. Such penalties could theoretically assume the same 
form as those contained in Article 13, namely sanctions for non-compliance and also for 
the introduction of policies or programmes which undermine the functioning of the 
KAZA TFCA. 
 
 
 
6.3: Mandatory Inclusion of Environmental Ministers: 
 
Article 6 of the MoU describes the composition of the National Coordinating Agencies, 
which is identical to the composition of the Ministerial Committee, and the members of 
whom have significant, if not overriding (see further below, in 6.4) influence on the entire 
institutional functioning of the KAZA TFCA. In terms of this Article, the ‘Ministries 
responsible for Natural Resources, Wildlife and/or Tourism as the Coordinating 
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Agencies’ shall be designated as the Coordinating Agencies by their Member States. 
While the spheres of tourism and wildlife/conservation are both allocated to single 
Ministries in Botswana, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe, they are divided between 
separate Ministries in Angola. The Minister of Hotels and Tourism represented Angola at 
the signing of the MoU, rather than the Minister of Environment and Urban Affairs. 
Whilst it is not made clear which Minister will become a member of the National 
Coordinating Agency on behalf of Angola, the formalities of the MoU suggest that it will 
not be the Minister of Environment and Urban Affairs. It is suggested that, while tourism 
is to be an important function of the KAZA TFCA, the primary reason for the genesis of 
the project is, as the name suggests, conservation. In light of this, it is only appropriate 
that each Member State’s Minister responsible for environmental administration represent 
that country, and this should be mandated in the forthcoming Treaty. 
 
 
 
6.4: Decentralisation of Powers: 
 
As explained in the previous chapter, a possibly significant feature of the MoU is its 
vesting of administrative and decisive powers potentially almost entirely in the five 
Ministers comprising the Ministerial Committee. Whilst this may be simply a side-effect 
of the desire of the Member States not to compromise their sovereignty in any way by 
allowing any significant powers to devolve upon non-governmental bodies, the result is 
nonetheless a potentially skewed allocation of responsibility. If disagreements arise 
between members of the Ministerial Committee, these disagreements are likely to 
pervade every institutional aspect of the creation and functioning of the KAZA TFCA, 
and in this way the institutional arrangements may be viewed as obstructionist or counter-
productive. As outlined above, the successful establishment of the TFCA is going to 
depend heavily upon external funding and foreign investors are always alert to any whiff 
of corruption in African countries – this is also a risk which could be averted by more 
decentralisation of powers with regard to the TFCA. It is suggested that this be achieved 
in the Treaty by means of inclusion of specifically designated numbers of stakeholders as 
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members of the Technical Committee so as to outweigh the presence of the designated 
Ministers. Furthermore, the expertise of different interest groups should play a more 
significant role in the Technical Committee, as described further below (see 6.4) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.5: Stakeholder Representation 
 
‘Stakeholders’ are broadly defined in terms of the MoU and their interests are frequently 
referred to, but more definition is required in order to ensure that these interests are in 
fact actually addressed. The different types of interest group who may fall into the 
category should be more clearly identified in order to ensure adequate representation. 
The ‘consultative structures’ (Article 6 of the MoU) used to select the stakeholders and 
enable stakeholder representation in, for instance, the Technical Committee, should be 
clearly defined as including stakeholders from various interest groups in order to balance 
the interests of local communities, conservation and ecology factions and tourism-related 
representatives, all of whom may be defined as ‘stakeholders’ in terms of the MoU.  
 
 
6.6: Harmonization of Environmental Policy: 
 
Although Article 5 of the MoU mentions the harmonization of natural resources 
management approaches and tourism development across international boundaries and 
Article 9 requires the Technical Committee to harmonize the expectations and aims of the 
Member State Governments, the document does not prescribe any harmonization of 
environmental policy for the area. It is suggested that a system of consistent policy for 
like areas and migratory species would greatly facilitate the functioning of the TFCA, and 
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that the Treaty should provide for legislative review in order to achieve this 
harmonization. 
 
 
6.7: Concluding Remarks:  
 
The KAZA TFCA Memorandum of Understanding is essentially a tentative document 
and the first step in a protracted, complex and ambitious process, the magnitude of which 
has not been attempted on our continent before. As such, it would be unrealistic to expect 
too much in the way of concrete obligations to be established at this early stage. 
However, certain issues involved in the creation of a TFCA involving five countries will 
have to be addressed and these intentions must be obvious from the outset if the project is 
to achieve any practical value. Inconsistent membership of the international conventions 
which might influence the conservation management (namely CITES and the Bonn 
Convention) and a lack of harmonization of domestic conservation policy means that the 
SADC Wildlife Protocol is the only sphere in which all five countries have affirmed their 
common intentions with regard to wildlife conservation. Whilst the principles enumerated 
in the MoU are worthy ones, of transboundary cooperation, economic development 
through tourism, stakeholder participation, biodiversity conservation and sustainable 
development and it is undeniable that no TFCA could be established without these 
objectives, the MoU’s chief value is as a source of moral pressure accruing upon the 
countries involved. Firm and enforceable commitments and action plans are required 
from the Treaty if the project is to succeed. 
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APPENDIX A: THE KAZA TFCA MOU 
 
 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 
 
 
Made and entered into by and between 
 
 
 
THE GOVERNMENTS OF: 
 
 
 
 THE REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA, 
 
 
 
THE REPUBLIC OF BOTSWANA, 
 
 
 
THE REPUBLIC OF NAMIBIA, 
 
 
 
THE REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA, 
 
 
AND 
 
 
THE REPUBLIC OF ZIMBABWE 
 
 
 
Concerning 
 
 
 
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE KAVANGO-ZAMBEZI TRANSFRONTIER 
CONSERVATION AREA 
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PREAMBLE 
 
We, the Governments of: 
 
The Republic of Angola; 
 
The Republic of Botswana;  
 
The Republic of Namibia; 
 
The Republic of Zambia and 
 
The Republic of Zimbabwe,  
 
 Hereinafter jointly referred to as the “Parties” and/or “Member States”. 
 
 
AFFIRMING that Member States have sovereign right over their natural resources and 
the corresponding responsibility to conserve and sustainably utilize these resources; 
 
RECOGNISING  the legal and other rights of stakeholders as major contributors of land 
and other resources to the Kavango and Zambezi River basins; 
 
CONSCIOUS of the benefits to be derived from close co-operation and the maintenance 
of friendly relations with each other; 
 
AWARE that the conservation and sustainable use of natural resources amongst our 
nations contribute to sustainable economic development and the conservation of 
biological diversity; 
 
RECALLING that all Parties to this Agreement are signatories to the Southern African 
Development Community  (SADC) Treaty 1992, SADC Protocols on Trade (1996), 
Development of Tourism (1998), and Wildlife Conservation and Law Enforcement 
(1999); 
 
FURTHER RECALLING that Member States seeking to establish this Transfrontier 
Conservation Area are Parties to and/or signatories of the African Convention on the 
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (Algiers, 1968), the Convention on the 
Conservation of Wetlands of International Importance (Ramsar Convention, 1971), the 
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World Heritage Convention (Paris, 1972), the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) (Washington, 1973) the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (Rio de Janeiro, 1992); and 
 
ACKNOWLEDGING the need for co-operation among the collaborating Member States 
in managing wildlife and developing tourism, in sharing information about wildlife 
conservation and tourism, and in building national capacity within our nations;  
 
 
DESIRING to establish a common framework for the conservation of healthy 
ecosystems and the development of a vibrant and sustainable tourism industry for the 
benefit of their peoples; 
 
NOW THERFORE the Member States have agreed as follows: - 
 
ARTICLE 1 
 
Definitions 
 
In this Memorandum of Understanding (hereinafter referred to as the “MoU”) the terms 
and expressions defined in Article 1 shall bear the same meaning unless the context 
otherwise requires: 
 
 
“Conservation” means the protection, maintenance, rehabilitation, 
restoration and enhancement of the biological and 
non-biological resources; 
 
“Cultural resources” means any physical and spiritual property 
associated with past and present human use, cultural 
activities and history; 
 
“National Coordinating Agency” means that body identified in Article 6 for such 
purposes; 
 
 
“NP” means National Park; 
 
“Stakeholders” means individuals or groups of individuals or 
representative institutions with a stake, direct 
interest in the Transfrontier Conservation Area 
development and management, such as local or 
district councils; local communities (i.e. groups of 
people living in or adjacent to the TFCA, bound 
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together by social and economic relations based on 
shared interest); 
 
“Sustainable use” means use in a way and at a rate that does not lead 
to the long-term decline of renewable natural 
resources; 
 
 
“Transfrontier Conservation Area” means the area or the component of a large  
(TFCA)    ecological region that straddles the boundaries of                  
two or more countries, encompassing one or more 
protected areas, as well as multiple resources use 
areas and 
 
  
“Wildlife” means non-domesticated animal and plant life 
occurring within natural ecosystems and habitats. 
 
 
ARTICLE 2 
 
Scope and Name of the TFCA 
 
This MoU seeks to establish and develop a Transfrontier Conservation Area which shall 
be called Kavango-Zambezi Transfrontier Conservation Area (KAZA TFCA). 
 
 
ARTICLE 3 
 
Geographical Extent of the KAZA TFCA 
 
(1) The Member States shall, in consultation with their stakeholders, jointly establish 
the KAZA Transfrontier Conservation Area, which will include the areas known 
as:- 
 
(a) In the Republic of Angola,  
 
 The Luiana Partial Reserve and Mavinga Partial Reserve, Long-Mavinga     
            Hunting Area, Luengue Hunting Area, Luiana Hunting Area, Mucusso    
            Hunting Area and other land to be determined by migratory wildlife   
            movement. 
             
(b) In the Republic of Botswana, 
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 The Okavango Delta (including the Moremi Game Reserve, Chobe-
 Linyanti river system (including the Chobe NP), Makgadikgadi – Nxai 
 NP and other land to be determined by migratory wildlife movement. 
 
 
(c) In the Republic of Namibia, 
 
 The Bwabwata NP, Mudumu NP, Mamili NP, the Caprivi State Forest 
 Reserve, Khaudom Game Park, conservancies in between them and other
 land and to be determined by migratory wildlife movement. 
 
 
(d) In the Republic of Zambia: 
 
 The Kafue NP and adjoining Game Management areas, Sioma-Ngwezi 
 NP, Mosi-oa-Tunya NP, Mumbwa, Namwala and West-Zambezi Game 
 Management  Areas, the Siavonga area and other land to be 
 determined by migratory wildlife movement. 
 
 
(e) In the Republic of Zimbabwe: 
 
 The Hwange NP, Zambezi NP, Kazuma Pan NP, Matetsi and Deka Safari 
 Areas, adjoining designated Forest Areas, with potential expansion   
      eastwards to Lake Kariba, Matusadonha NP, Chizarira NP, Chirisa Safari  
      Area, and Chete Safari Area and other land to be determined by migratory  
      wildlife movement. 
 
In defining the geographical areas for inclusion in the TFCA as outlined above, it is 
understood that this does not preclude the later inclusion and/or exclusion of additional 
areas into and out of the TFCAs, provided that such amendments shall be done by mutual 
consent of the Member States and in keeping with the objectives of the MoU. 
 
 
ARTICLE 4 
   
Principles 
 
1) Each Member State shall ensure the protection and management of those parts of   
the Kavango Zambezi ecosystem falling directly under its jurisdiction  or control 
and the development of tourism so that activities in one country will not cause any 
adverse effects in areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. 
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2) Pursuant to the attainment of the principles contained in this Article, Member 
States shall; 
 a) ensure co-operation at the national level among governmental authorities, 
communities, non-governmental organizations and private sector; 
 
b) co-operate to develop common approaches to natural resources management 
and tourism development and; 
 
c) collaborate to achieve the objectives of relevant international agreements to            
which they are party. 
 
3) The Member States will respect the rights of stakeholders recognizable under 
National Law and International Law. 
 
4) A Member State may in terms of its domestic law enter into contractual 
arrangements with stakeholders regarding the protection and regulation of 
matters affecting such rights. 
 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 5 
 
Objectives of the TFCA 
 
1)       The objectives of the TFCA are to:- 
 
(a) Foster trans-national collaboration and co-operation among Member States 
in implementing ecosystems and cultural resource management through 
the establishment and development of the TFCA; 
 
(b) Promote alliances in the management of biological and cultural resources 
and encourage social, economic and other partnerships among the 
Governments and the stakeholders; 
 
(c) Enhance ecosystem integrity and natural ecological processes by 
harmonizing natural resources management approaches and tourism 
development across international boundaries; 
 
(d) Develop mechanisms and strategies for local communities to participate 
meaningfully in, and tangibly benefit from the TFCA; 
 
(e) Promote cross-border tourism as a means of fostering regional socio-
economic development 
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   2)            The Member States may, after consultation with stakeholders, agree to  
        other objectives. 
 
 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 6 
 
National Coordinating Agencies 
 
1) In order to give effect to the intent and objectives as expressed in this MoU, the 
 Member States shall designate the Ministries responsible for Environment, 
 Natural Resources, Wildlife and/or Tourism as the Coordinating Agencies. 
   
2)  A National Coordinating Agency will develop consultative structures to enable 
 representation by these stakeholders for the co-ordination of activities leading to 
 the establishment of the TFCA. 
 
 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 7 
 
Institutional Framework  
 
The institutional framework of this MoU will be:- 
 
(a) the Kavango-Zambezi TFCA  Ministerial Committee; 
 
(b) the Kavango-Zambezi  TFCA  Technical Committee; 
 
(c) the Kavango-Zambezi TFCA Working Groups, Task Forces and any other ad 
hoc Committees that may be established , as and when required; 
 
(d) the Kavango-Zambezi TFCA Secretariat. 
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ARTICLE 8 
 
Ministerial Committee 
 
1) The Ministerial Committee will comprise of the Ministers responsible for  the 
Coordinating Agencies as defined under Article 6 of this MoU; 
 
2) The Committee will: 
 
(a) be hosted on a rotational basis, with the country hosting providing  the          
     Chairperson for the meeting; 
 
(b) ordinarily meet once a year; and  
 
(c) make decisions by consensus. 
 
 
3) The Committee will: 
                  (a) finalize the draft Treaty to establish the TFCA and present the same to   
                       their respective Governments and; 
 
(b) be responsible for overall policy guidance in the process of establishing   
      the TFCA and; 
 
(c) monitor progress in the establishment of the TFCA. 
 
 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 9 
 
 Technical Committee 
 
1) The Technical Committee shall be made up of members of the National 
Coordinating Agencies and designated representatives of stakeholders identified 
through the consultative structures provided for in Article 6. The TFCA 
Secretariat as defined in Article 11 shall be a member of the Technical 
Committee. 
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2) To maintain continuity, designated members of the Technical Committee shall 
attend all meetings in person and where an alternative is to attend a meeting, the 
designated member will ensure that the alternate is fully briefed and given the 
necessary authority and mandate to act as a member of the Technical Committee. 
 
3) National and International Conservation and Tourism Organizations, or any other 
body and/or individuals that may advance the objectives of the TFCA may be 
invited to participate in meetings of the Technical Committee either as observers 
or advisors. 
 
4)  The Technical Committee shall be responsible for:- 
 
(a) identifying the steps required for establishing the TFCA; 
 
(b) negotiating and drafting the Treaty for the establishment of the TFCA; 
 
(c) developing action plans for the establishment of the TFCA; 
 
(d) setting up Working Groups for undertaking specific activities of the 
TFCA development; 
 
(e) harmonizing the expectations and aims of the Governments with respect 
to the establishment and management of the TFCA; 
 
(f) ensuring stakeholder participation in the overall planning and 
establishment of the TFCA; 
 
(g) monitoring the establishment of the TFCA; 
 
(h) translating decisions of the Ministerial Committee into operational 
guidelines and strategies; 
 
(i) preparation of a draft management and development plan for the TFCA; 
 
(j) preparing reports and other documentation for the Ministerial Committee; 
 
(k) overseeing the administration  of funds generated for the establishment of 
the  TFCA; and 
 
(l) monitoring activities of stakeholders or institutions in the planning and 
development of the TFCA, in particular but not limited to the field of 
immigration, customs, veterinary services, archaeology, cultural resources 
management, tourism development initiatives and security. 
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5) The Technical Committee shall be chaired on a rotational basis, with the host 
country providing the chairperson for that meeting. 
 
6) The Technical Committee shall adopt its own rules of procedure. 
 
7) The Technical Committee shall meet at least four times a year, or more frequently 
depending on need. 
 
8) Decisions of the Technical Committee shall be by consensus. 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 10 
 
TFCA Working Groups 
 
1) The Working Groups shall be composed of representatives appointed by the 
National Coordinating Agencies. 
 
2) The Working Groups shall be responsible for: 
 
(a) representing the interests of different sections of society in each country 
regarding the planning and development of the TFCA; 
 
(b) collecting information and preparing technical reports in pursuance of the 
objectives of this MoU for Technical Committee; and 
 
(c) facilitating discussions on matters of mutual interest between the Member 
States. 
 
3) The Working Groups will adopt their own rules of procedure. 
 
4) The Working Group shall report to the Technical Committee. 
 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 11 
 
The Secretariat 
 
1) To promote efficiency, coordination and accountability in the TFCA planning and 
development process, a TFCA Secretariat will be established by the Ministerial 
Committee through recommendations of the Technical Committee. 
 
2) The Secretariat shall be headed by a Project Coordinator. 
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   3) The functions of the Secretariat shall be to – 
 
(a) drive and coordinate the activities associated with the planning and 
development of the TFCA; 
 
(b) ensure that an effective TFCA Technical Committee and TFCA Working 
Groups are established with full representation, and that a working 
programme focused on achieving the objectives of the TFCA is sustained; 
 
(c)  coordinate the drafting of the Treaty for presentation to the  
   Ministerial Committee through the Technical Committee; 
 
(d) coordinate the drafting and implementation of an effective action plan for 
achieving the objectives of the TFCA, with full participation of the 
relevant stakeholders; 
 
(e) ensure that appropriate processes and procedures in planning and 
developing the TFCA are followed in accordance with relevant national 
laws, regional protocols and international treaties; 
 
(f) prepare reports on resolutions and directives emanating from the 
Ministerial and Technical Committees; 
 
(g) facilitate the convening of meetings of the TFCA Committees and 
Working Groups; 
 
(h) liaise with the Technical Committee in identifying activities that would 
require funding and assist with the mobilization of resources; 
 
(i) foster collaboration and linkages with other organizations; 
 
(j) provide regular management and financial progress reports; and    
 
(k) carry out any other assignments deemed necessary for achieving the 
objectives of the TFCA committees. 
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ARTICLE 12 
 
Financing  
 
Funding for the implementation of this MoU shall consist of:- 
 
1) Member States contributions, the level of which shall be determined by the 
Ministerial Committee on the recommendations of the Technical Committee. 
 
2) Donations. 
 
3) Contributions from other stakeholders and development partners with the 
approval of the Technical Committee.  
 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 13 
 
Settlement of Disputes 
 
1) Any dispute between Member States arising out of the interpretation or 
implementation of this MoU will be settled amicably through consultation and/or 
negotiation between the Parties concerned. 
 
2) Should the aforesaid dispute not be resolved in the manner referred to above, any 
Party may submit the said dispute for arbitration to SADC.  
 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 14 
 
Entry into Effect 
 
This MoU shall enter into force upon signature by any three (3) of the participating 
Governments. 
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ARTICLE 15 
 
Amendments 
 
Any proposal for the amendment of this MoU by a Member State, shall be notified in 
writing to other Member States for at least three months before it is considered for 
adoption by the Member States and shall enter into force upon such adoption. 
 
 
  
 
 
ARTICLE 16 
 
Withdrawal 
 
1) Any Member State may withdraw from this MoU at any time by giving written 
notice of not less than twelve months to the other Member States. 
 
2) This MoU shall automatically terminate upon the entry into force of a Treaty on 
the establishment of the Kavango-Zambezi Transfrontier Conservation Area. 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto by their 
respective Governments, have signed this Memorandum of Understanding in triplicate in 
the English and Portuguese languages, all texts having equal validity. 
 
 
THUS DONE and signed at Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe on this……… … day of  
 
……………………..2006. 
 
 
 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA 
 
 
 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOTSWANA 
 
 
 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF NAMIBIA 
 
 
 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA 
 
 
 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ZIMBABWE 
 
 
 
